Joost Jager <joost.ja...@gmail.com> writes: >> >> > A crucial thing is that these hold fees don't need to be symmetric. A new >> > node for example that opens a channel to a well-known, established >> routing >> > node will be forced to pay a hold fee, but won't see any traffic coming >> in >> > anymore if it announces a hold fee itself. Nodes will need to build a >> > reputation before they're able to command hold fees. Similarly, routing >> > nodes that have a strong relation may decide to not charge hold fees to >> > each other at all. >> >> I can still establish channels to various low-reputation nodes, and then >> use them to grief a high-reputation node. Not only do I get to jam up >> the high-reputation channels, as a bonus I get the low-reputation nodes >> to pay for it! > > So you're saying: > > ATTACKER --(no hold fee)--> LOW-REP --(hold fee)--> HIGH-REP > > If I were LOW-REP, I'd still charge an unknown node a hold fee. I would > only waive the hold fee for high-reputation nodes. In that case, the > attacker is still paying for the attack. I may be forced to take a small > loss on the difference, but at least the larger part of the pain is felt by > the attacker. The assumption is that this is sufficient enough to deter the > attacker from even trying.
No, because HIGH-REP == ATTACKER and LOW-REP pays. > I guess your concern is with trying to become a routing node? If nobody > knows you, you'll be forced to pay hold fees but can't attract traffic if > you charge hold fees yourself. That indeed means that you'll need to be > selective with whom you accept htlcs from. Put limits in place to control > the expenditure. Successful forwards will earn a routing fee which could > compensate for the loss in hold fees too. "Be selectinve with whom you accept HTLCs from"... it always comes back to incentives to de-anonymize the network :( > I think this mechanism can create interesting dynamics on the network and > eventually reach an equilibrium that is still healthy in terms of > decentralization and privacy. I suspect that if you try to create a set of actual rules for nodes using actual numbers, I think you'll find you enter a complexity spiral as you try to play whack-a-mole on all the different ways you can exploit it. (This is what happened every time I tried to design a peer-penalty system). Cheers, Rusty. _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing list Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
