Hi all,

> > This gets compounded as soon as we start gossiping about reputations,
> > since now our decisions are no longer based just on information we can
> > witness ourselves, or at least verify its correctness, and as such an
> > attacker can most likely "earn" a positive reputation in some other
> > part of the world, and then turn around and attack the nodes that
> > trusted the reputation shared from those other parts.
> >
>
> Notice that we are not gossiping about our peer's reputation. The only
> thing that a node communicates to its neighbor is whether they see an HTLC
> as endorsed or just neutral, that is, should this HTLC be granted access to

Yeah, this is a good point. If we gossip this information, we may see 
different values for the same node, and I'm sure someone will propose a 
"proof who is telling the true" for this. I don't want the reputation we 
end up with to be gossiped to our peers.

In my last research on this, I noted that some nodes with Tor have a completely
unrealistic vision of the network. They believe that other nodes are 
offline, but the problem is actually the overloaded Tor network.

Cheers!

Vincent
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