Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 

Joint Strike Fighter Submissions 

Submissions received by the Committee ...

Number 8: Mr David Archibald (PDF 2400 KB) (snipped)

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Joint_fighter/Submissions


A. Executive Summary

The F-35 has many deficiencies. Of those deficiencies, at least six are 
showstoppers that mean it will fail in its assigned role as an air superiority 
fighter for the RAAF:

1. The F-35’s engine is failing at too high a rate and its reliability is not 
improving fast enough to be approved for operational use (page 23)1.

2. The F-35’s requirement for an 8,000 foot runway limits its use to just five 
runways across northern Australia (page 18)2. It requires a 10,000 foot runway 
for training, putting it in the league of the B-52.

3. The F-35’s operating cost in excess of US$50,000 per hour means that 
Australia won’t be able to afford to keep our pilots proficient enough for 
combat (page 26)3.

4. Being designed as a light bomber, the F-35 is less manoeuvrable than fighter 
designs up to 50-years-old and will be shot out of the sky by modern fighter 
aircraft (page 29)4. For example, Indonesia’s Su-35s are expected to be able to 
shoot down 2.4 F-35s for every Su-35 lost5.

5. The F-35 uses its fuel for cooling its electronics (page 21)6. The aircraft 
won’t start if its fuel is too warm, making deployment in northern Australia 
problematic.

6. The F-35 has a logistics system that requires an internet connection to the 
United States (page 36). If this link is down, the aircraft can’t fly even if 
there is nothing wrong with it7. It is bizarre that Australia would even 
contemplate operating an aircraft under this arrangement.


The F-35 was conceived more than 20 years ago, and the first flight took place 
10 years ago. Though it is still in development, it is now apparent that the 
F-35, optimised for stealth against x-band radar, is a technological dead-end 
superseded by improved technology in other parts of the electromagnetic 
spectrum. The United States Department of Defense is losing faith in the F-358 
and is considering9 acquisition of F-15 and F-16 aircraft to fill its 
capability gap.

Fortunately for Australia, another aircraft is now available that is far more 
capable than the F-35, while being one third of the price and having an 
operating cost one tenth of that of the F-35. This is the Gripen E from Saab in 
Sweden (page 58). Brazil is assembling the Gripen E to supply its air force and 
for regional sales. Australia could also assemble the Gripen E, as we did with 
the F/A-18A and the Mirage III before it, which would substantially boost 
Australia’s defence capability. Australia should make this choice soon to avoid 
unnecessary expenditure on life extension for the F/A-18A fleet (page 62).


B. Australia’s Future Air Defence Needs

Australia cannot be invaded if at least either of two conditions holds – that 
Australian submarines sink any invasion fleet approaching the Australian coast; 
or Australian fighter aircraft maintain air superiority over Australia and out 
to the Indonesian archipelago. The latter condition would mean that enemy 
surface forces, on sea or land, could be interdicted at will. Ideally we would 
maintain both capabilities to be sure and make the whole job easier. If we 
don’t maintain air superiority over northern Australia and its approaches then 
life, and staying alive, becomes far more difficult for the rest of our armed 
forces. So having the right fighter aircraft in the requisite quantity to 
achieve air superiority is one of the two major considerations in our force 
structure.

Australia is currently relying upon the F-35 to provide air superiority. The 
F-35 had its origin in the Joint Advanced Strike Technology programme 
established in January 1994. Australia announced that it would join the F-35 
program on 22nd June, 2002. This was against the advice of the Department of 
Defence’s Investment Analysis Branch1 which concluded that there was not enough 
information about the proposed aircraft to determine its cost-effectiveness. 
The first flight of an F-35 was on 15th December, 2006. Australia started 
ordering F/A-18E Super Hornet aircraft in 2007 to offset delays in the F-35 
programme. Almost a decade later, much the same situation prevails.

The inadequacies of the F-35 are now readily apparent. It was designed 20 years 
ago as a light bomber with air defence provided by other aircraft. It is still 
a light bomber that can operate only in uncontested airspace. The F-35 cannot 
be relied upon to provide air defence2. The United States may yet drop the F-35 
programme. While momentum towards that decision is building, the F-35 programme 
is kept going in part by a perception that there is currently no alternative 
aircraft that could fill the void in the acquisition programme that would be 
created by the cancellation of the F-35. There is also a perception that a 
number of US allies would be left high and dry by cancellation of the F-35.

The optimum solution to Australia’s F-35 problem is the Saab Gripen E3. It is 
also the optimum solution for the United States’ F-35 problem. The Gripen E 
uses a US-made engine and many other US-made components. Saab’s partner in the 
United States is Boeing which makes the Super Hornet. The Super Hornet 
production line in St Louis is scheduled for closure 2017. It would be 
surprising if Boeing has not approached Saab on the subject of an American 
production run for the Gripen E using the St Louis production line. There are 
precedents for the manufacture of combat aircraft in the United States under 
licence. For example, the English Electric Canberra bomber was built in the 
United States as the Martin B-57. More recently the British Harrier jet was 
built as the AV-8B for the Marines.

The most capable fighter aircraft currently flying is the F-22. Production of 
the F-22 was truncated in 2011 due to its high capital and operating costs. The 
next most capable is the Gripen E. While the Gripen E is almost as capable as 
the F-22, its build cost is one quarter of that of the F-22 and its operating 
cost4 is one tenth that of the F-22. The latter attribute means that countries 
operating the Gripen E can train their pilots to a much higher level of 
proficiency than F-22 pilots. In combat, that would result in the Gripen E 
being more effective than the F-22. Lockheed Martin made the F-22 and is the 
manufacturer of the F-35. The Dassault Rafale is close to the Gripen E in 
capability as the aircraft are very similar in design philosophy. The Gripen 
E’s advantages over the Rafale include the fact that its acquisition cost and 
operating cost are one third of that of the Rafale and the fact that it can use 
a number of US-sourced missiles. The Gripen E has a slightly higher 
instantaneous turn rate than the Rafale and would be better at dodging 
air-to-air missiles, and thus is more survivable. The Gripen E’s other missile 
counter-measures are also very effective.


With respect to the fighter aircraft of potential adversaries, Indonesia10 
recently committed to taking 12 Su-35 fighters and has indicated that they 
would like to buy a further 12. Those 12 Indonesian Su-35s would shoot down 29 
Australian F-35s before they would be shot down themselves. If the Indonesians 
build their Su-35 fleet to their desired 24 aircraft, they could shoot down the 
bulk of Australia’s intended F-35 fleet while retaining the rest of their air 
force. Indonesia would then have control over Australian air space as far south 
as Townsville from bases in their own territory.

The larger threat in our region is the People’s Republic of China (China). The 
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has some 250 Chengdu J-10 fighter 
aircraft. This is a delta wing with canards design similar to the Gripen E and 
Rafale. The PLAAF also has some 380 Su-27 aircraft and its more advanced 
derivatives. It is currently in the process of buying 24 Su-35 aircraft. China 
is also developing two aircraft, the J-20 and the J-31, with stealth shaping. 
While nominally a fighter aircraft, the J-20 may be optimised on delivering 
long range air-to-air missiles against higher value targets such as AWACS 
aircraft and tanker aircraft11.

The development of the three 3,000 metre long airfields in the Spratly Islands 
brings the PLAAF about 1,000 kilometres closer to Australia. From those Spratly 
bases, Su-35 fighters and H-6 bombers, without inflight refuelling, could 
deliver cruise missiles in an arc from Broome to Katherine. Of course they 
could range much further south with inflight refuelling.

During World War 2, Japanese Zero fighters based in Kupang, West Timor ranged 
as far south at Exmouth, 1,600 km away. If China gains control of Indonesia, as 
Japan did in World War 2, or co-opts Indonesia then PLAAF aircraft based out of 
Kupang or Merauke in West Papua would have control over Australian air space as 
far south as a line between Townsville and Exmouth without inflight refuelling. 
Air-launched cruise missiles could reach as far south as Sydney without 
inflight refuelling. This is based on Australia being defended by the intended 
fleet of 75 F-35s which are expected to last about three days in a conflict 
against an equal number of pure fighter aircraft derived from the Su-2712.

With respect to the quantity of Gripen E aircraft that Australia should 
acquire, Australia introduced the Mirage III into service in 1964 and had a 
total of 110 of these delta-winged aircraft introduced to service. It was built 
at Fisherman’s Bend in Melbourne. Australia’s population in 1964 was 11.2 
million with a GDP per capita in dollars of the day of US$2,137 for a total 
US$24 billion. Australia now has more than twice the population it had in 1964 
with a GDP of US$1,560 billion and a GDP per capita of US$67,500. In constant 
dollar terms, this is more than five times the GDP per capita that Australia 
had in 1964. Combined with the population having more than doubled, Australia’s 
economy is more than 10 times larger than it was in 1964 when we had 110 
frontline fighter aircraft.

Choice and quantity of our fighter aircraft is an existential question for 
Australia. The appropriate number to aim for initially may be two to three 
times the number of Mirage 3 aircraft that we had 50 years ago. The midpoint of 
that range is 275 aircraft. (snip)

--

Cheers,
Stephen


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