Note the first paragraph of the Ïnitial Analysis:
"[...] Using this cryptographic loading method, the WannaCry DLL is never 
directly exposed on disk and not vulnerable to antivirus software scans."

David L.

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject:        TA17-132A: Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware
Date:   Mon, 15 May 2017 00:39:06 -0500
From:   US-CERT <[email protected]>
Reply-To:       [email protected]
To:     [email protected]



TA17-132A: Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware

U.S. Department of Homeland Security US-CERT

National Cyber Awareness System:

 

TA17-132A: Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware 
<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-132A>
05/12/2017 09:36 PM EDT

Original release date: May 12, 2017 | Last revised: May 15, 2017


      Systems Affected

Microsoft Windows operating systems


      Overview

According to numerous open-source reports, a widespread ransomware campaign is 
affecting various organizations with reports of tens of thousands of infections 
in as many as 74 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, 
Russia, Taiwan, France, and Japan. The software can run in as many as 27 
different languages.

The latest version of this ransomware variant, known as WannaCry, WCry, or 
Wanna Decryptor, was discovered the morning of May 12, 2017, by an independent 
security researcher and has spread rapidly over several hours, with initial 
reports beginning around 4:00 AM EDT, May 12, 2017. Open-source reporting 
indicates a requested ransom of .1781 bitcoins, roughly $300 U.S.

This Alert is the result of efforts between the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to highlight known cyber threats. DHS 
and the FBI continue to pursue related information of threats to federal, 
state, and local government systems and as such, further releases of technical 
information may be forthcoming.


      Description

Initial reports indicate the hacker or hacking group behind the WannaCry 
campaign is gaining access to enterprise servers either through Remote Desktop 
Protocol (RDP) compromise or through the exploitation of a critical Windows SMB 
vulnerability. Microsoft released a security update for the MS17-010 
<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx> 
vulnerability on March 14, 2017. Additionally, Microsoft released patches for 
Windows XP, Windows 8, and Windows Server 2003 
<http://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4012598> operating 
systems on May 13, 2017. According to open sources, one possible infection 
vector is via phishing emails.


      Technical Details


        /Indicators of Compromise (IOC)/

        IOCs are provided within the accompanying .xlsx 
<https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ALERT_TA17-132A.xlsx> file of this 
report.

        /Yara Signatures/

|rule Wanna_Cry_Ransomware_Generic {|

|       meta:|

|              description = "Detects WannaCry Ransomware on Disk and in 
Virtual Page"|

|              author = "US-CERT Code Analysis Team"|

|              reference = "not set"                                        |

|              date = "2017/05/12"|

|       hash0 = "4DA1F312A214C07143ABEEAFB695D904"|

|       strings:|

|              $s0 = {410044004D0049004E0024}|

|              $s1 = "WannaDecryptor"|

|              $s2 = "WANNACRY"|

|              $s3 = "Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic"|

|              $s4 = "PKS"|

|              $s5 = "StartTask"|

|              $s6 = "wcry@123"|

|              $s7 = {2F6600002F72}|

|              $s8 = "unzip 0.15 Copyrigh"|

|              $s9 = "Global\WINDOWS_TASKOSHT_MUTEX"|        

 |             |$|s10 = "Global\WINDOWS_TASKCST_MUTEX"|   

|             $s11 = 
{7461736B736368652E657865000000005461736B5374617274000000742E776E7279000069636163}|

|             $s12 = 
{6C73202E202F6772616E742045766572796F6E653A46202F54202F43202F5100617474726962202B68}|

|             $s13 = "WNcry@2ol7"|

|             $s14 = "wcry@123"|

|             $s15 = "Global\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA"|

|       condition:|

|              $s0 and $s1 and $s2 and $s3 or $s4 and $s5 and $s6 and $s7 or 
$s8 and $s9 and $s10 or $s11 and $s12 or $s13 or $s14 or $s15|

|}|

|/*The following Yara ruleset is under the GNU-GPLv2 license 
(http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html) and open to any user or 
organization, as long as you use it under this license.*/|

|rule MS17_010_WanaCry_worm {|

|       meta:|

|              description = "Worm exploiting MS17-010 and dropping WannaCry 
Ransomware"|

|              author = "Felipe Molina (@felmoltor)"|

|              reference = "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41987/";|

|              date = "2017/05/12"|

|       strings:|

|              $ms17010_str1="PC NETWORK PROGRAM 1.0"|

|              $ms17010_str2="LANMAN1.0"|

|              $ms17010_str3="Windows for Workgroups 3.1a"|

|              $ms17010_str4="__TREEID__PLACEHOLDER__"|

|              $ms17010_str5="__USERID__PLACEHOLDER__"|

|              $wannacry_payload_substr1 = "h6agLCqPqVyXi2VSQ8O6Yb9ijBX54j"|

|              $wannacry_payload_substr2 = "h54WfF9cGigWFEx92bzmOd0UOaZlM"|

|              $wannacry_payload_substr3 = "tpGFEoLOU6+5I78Toh/nHs/RAP"|

|       condition:|

|              all of them|

|}|

 




        /Initial Analysis/

The WannaCry ransomware received and analyzed by US-CERT is a loader that 
contains an AES-encrypted DLL. During runtime, the loader writes a file to disk 
named “t.wry”. The malware then uses an embedded 128-bit key to decrypt this 
file. This DLL, which is then loaded into the parent process, is the actual 
Wanna Cry Ransomware responsible for encrypting the user’s files. Using this 
cryptographic loading method, the WannaCry DLL is never directly exposed on 
disk and not vulnerable to antivirus software scans.

The newly loaded DLL immediately begins encrypting files on the victim’s system 
and encrypts the user’s files with 128-bit AES. A random key is generated for 
the encryption of each file.

The malware also attempts to access the IPC$ shares and SMB resources the 
victim system has access to. This access permits the malware to spread itself 
laterally on a compromised network. However, the malware never attempts to 
attain a password from the victim’s account in order to access the IPC$ share.

This malware is designed  to spread laterally on a network by gaining 
unauthorized access to the IPC$ share on network resources on the network on 
which it is operating.


      Impact

Ransomware not only targets home users; businesses can also become infected 
with ransomware, leading to negative consequences, including

  * temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information,
  * disruption to regular operations,
  * financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and
  * potential harm to an organization’s reputation.

Paying the ransom does not guarantee the encrypted files will be released; it 
only guarantees that the malicious actors receive the victim’s money, and in 
some cases, their banking information. In addition, decrypting files does not 
mean the malware infection itself has been removed.


      Solution

*_Recommended Steps for Prevention _*

  * Apply the Microsoft patch for the MS17-010 SMB vulnerability dated March 
14, 2017.
  * Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing e-mails from reaching the 
end users and authenticate in-bound e-mail using technologies like Sender 
Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance 
(DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent e-mail spoofing. 
  * Scan all incoming and outgoing e-mails to detect threats and filter 
executable files from reaching the end users.
  * Ensure anti-virus and anti-malware solutions are set to automatically 
conduct regular scans.
  * Manage the use of privileged accounts. Implement the principle of least 
privilege. No users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely 
needed. Those with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when 
necessary. 
  * Configure access controls including file, directory, and network share 
permissions with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific 
files, they should not have write access to those files, directories, or 
shares. 
  * Disable macro scripts from Microsoft Office files transmitted via e-mail. 
Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files 
transmitted via e-mail instead of full Office suite applications.
  * Develop, institute and practice employee education programs for identifying 
scams, malicious links, and attempted social engineering.

  * Have regular penetration tests run against the network. No less than once a 
year. Ideally, as often as possible/practical.
  * Test your backups to ensure they work correctly upon use.

*_Recommended Steps for Remediation_*

  * Contact law enforcement. We strongly encourage you to contact a local FBI 
field office upon discovery to report an intrusion and request assistance. 
Maintain and provide relevant logs.
  * Implement your security incident response and business continuity plan. 
Ideally, organizations should ensure they have appropriate backups so their 
response is simply to restore the data from a known clean backup. 

*_Defending Against Ransomware Generally_*

Precautionary measures to mitigate ransomware threats include:

  * Ensure anti-virus software is up-to-date.
  * Implement a data back-up and recovery plan to maintain copies of sensitive 
or proprietary data in a separate and secure location. Backup copies of 
sensitive data should not be readily accessible from local networks.
  * Scrutinize links contained in e-mails, and do not open attachments included 
in unsolicited e-mails.
  * Only download software – especially free software – from sites you know and 
trust.
  * Enable automated patches for your operating system and Web browser.

*_Report Notice_*

DHS and FBI encourages recipients who identify the use of tool(s) or techniques 
discussed in this document to report information to DHS or law enforcement 
immediately. We encourage you to contact DHS’s National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) ([email protected] 
<https://www.us-cert.govmailto:[email protected]> or 
888-282-0870), or the FBI through a local field office or the FBI’s Cyber 
Division ([email protected] 
<https://www.us-cert.govmailto:[email protected]>or 855-292-3937) to report an 
intrusion and to request incident response resources or technical assistance.


      References

  * Malwarebytes LABS: "WanaCrypt0r ransomware hits it big just before the 
weekend 
<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2017/05/wanacrypt0r-ransomware-hits-it-big-just-before-the-weekend/>
  * Malwarebytes LABS: "The worm that spreads WanaCrypt0r" 
<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/05/the-worm-that-spreads-wanacrypt0r/>
  * Microsoft: "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010" 
<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx>
  * Forbes: "An NSA Cyber Weapon Might Be Behind A Massive Global Ransomware 
Outbreak" 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/05/12/nsa-exploit-used-by-wannacry-ransomware-in-global-explosion/#4fb6a207e599>
  * Reuters: "Factbox: Don't click - What is the 'ransomware' WannaCry worm?" 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-hospitals-ransomware-idUSKBN1882O2>
  * GitHubGist: "WannaCry|WannaDecrypt0r NSA-Cybereweapon-Powered Ransomware 
Worm" <https://gist.github.com/rain-1/989428fa5504f378b993ee6efbc0b168>
  * Microsoft: “Microsoft Update Catalog: Patches for Windows XP, Windows 8, 
and Windows Server 2003”, (KB4012598) 
<http://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4012598>


      Revision History

  * May 12, 2017: Initial post
  * May 14, 2017: Corrected Syntax in the second Yara Rule
  * May 14, 2017: Added Microsoft link to patches for Windows XP, Windows 8, 
and Windows Server 2003
  * May 14, 2017: Corrected Syntax in the first Yara Rule

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