China’s Military Is Tied to Debilitating New Cyberattack Tool

An Israeli security company said the hacking software, called Aria-body, had 
been deployed against governments and state-owned companies in Australia and 
Southeast Asia.

By Ronen Bergman and Steven Lee Myers  May 7, 2020 Updated 5:37 p.m. ET  
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/world/asia/china-hacking-military-aria.html


On the morning of Jan. 3, an email was sent from the Indonesian Embassy in 
Australia to a member of the premier of Western Australia’s staff who worked on 
health and ecological issues. Attached was a Word document that aroused no 
immediate suspicions, since the intended recipient knew the supposed sender.

The attachment contained an invisible cyberattack tool called Aria-body, which 
had never been detected before and had alarming new capabilities. Hackers who 
used it to remotely take over a computer could copy, delete or create files and 
carry out extensive searches of the device’s data, and the tool had new ways of 
covering its tracks to avoid detection.

Now a cybersecurity company in Israel has identified Aria-body as a weapon 
wielded by a group of hackers, called Naikon, that has previously been traced 
to the Chinese military. And it was used against far more targets than the 
office of Mark McGowan, the premier of Western Australia, according to the 
company, Check Point Software Technologies, which released a report on Thursday 
about the tool.

In the preceding months, Naikon had also used it to hack government agencies 
and state-owned technology companies in Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Myanmar and Brunei, according to Check Point, which said the attacks 
underscored the breadth and sophistication of China’s use of cyberespionage 
against its neighbours.

“The Naikon group has been running a longstanding operation, during which it 
has updated its new cyberweapon time and time again, built an extensive 
offensive infrastructure and worked to penetrate many governments across Asia 
and the Pacific,” said Lotem Finkelstein, head of the cyberthreat intelligence 
group at Check Point.

What made these attacks so alarming, according to Check Point and other experts 
on Chinese cyberespionage, was the intrusive capabilities of Aria-body, the 
group’s new tool.

Aria-body could penetrate any computer used to open the file in which it was 
embedded and quickly make the computer obey the hackers’ instructions. That 
could include setting up a secret, hard-to-detect line of communication by 
which data on the targeted computer would flow to servers used by the attackers.

It could also replicate typing being done by the target user, meaning that had 
the Australia attack not been detected, the tool would have allowed whoever 
controlled it to see what a staff member was writing in the premier’s office, 
in real time

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade did not immediately 
respond to questions about the report.

“We know that China is probably the single biggest source of cyberespionage 
coming into Australia by a very long way,” said Peter Jennings, a former 
Australian defense official who is the executive director of the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute.

Faced with such criticism in recent years, Beijing has maintained that it is 
opposed to cyberattacks of any kind and that the Chinese government and 
military do not engage in hacking for the theft of trade secrets.

China’s cyberespionage efforts have shown no sign of relenting globally and may 
be intensifying as tensions with Australia, the United States and other 
countries have risen over trade, technology and, more recently, disputes over 
the coronavirus pandemic. Experts say its aim is to steal vast amounts of data 
from foreign governments and companies.

“This may be different in design, but these attacks all have the same purpose,” 
said Matthew Brazil, an American former diplomat and author of a new book on 
Chinese espionage, referring to Aria-body.

According to Check Point, the hacker using Aria-body was able to take over the 
computer used by an Indonesian diplomat at the embassy in Canberra, the 
Australian capital. The hacker found a document that the diplomat was working 
on, completed it and then sent it to the staff member in the Western Australian 
premier’s office, armed with the Aria-body tool.

It was discovered only because of a simple human error.

The hacker sending the email dispatched it to the wrong address. When the 
server in the premier’s office returned it with a note saying the email address 
had not been found, the transmission aroused suspicion that something in the 
original message was fishy, the authors of Check Point’s report wrote. That 
prompted the investigation that revealed the attempted attack — and its novel 
weapon.

Naikon was previously investigated by an American cybersecurity company, 
ThreatConnect, which in 2015 published a wide-ranging report on the group’s 
connection to the People’s Liberation Army.

The hacking group appeared to operate as part of the military’s Second 
Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, Unit 78020, based mainly in the southern city 
of Kunming, according to ThreatConnect. It is said to be responsible for 
China’s cyberoperations and technological espionage in Southeast Asia and the 
South China Sea, where Beijing is embroiled in territorial disputes with its 
neighbors.

A report by the Kaspersky Lab, a Russian cybersecurity company, called the 
group one of Asia’s most active “advanced persistent threats,” a term that 
security experts often use to describe state-backed hackers who run long-term 
campaigns of intrusion.

After the 2015 report disclosed Naikon’s main cyberweapons, the group seemed to 
disappear. Mr. Brazil, the former diplomat, noted that China had since 
reorganized its cyberespionage forces, shifting some from the People’s 
Liberation Army to the Ministry of State Security, effectively dividing their 
duties between military intelligence and diplomatic and economic espionage.

Check Point’s report suggests that Naikon may have remained active, though it 
is not clear whether it has shifted out of the military chain of command.

Since early 2019, according to the Check Point report, the group has 
accelerated efforts to expand its online infrastructure. The hacking group has 
purchased server space from Alibaba, the Chinese technology company, and 
registered domain names on GoDaddy, an American web-hosting firm.

In one case, Naikon commandeered a server of the Philippines’ Department of 
Science and Technology and used it to help disguise the origin of a Naikon 
attack, by making it seem as though it came from that server.

The group would intrude into computers by hiding Aria-body in Microsoft Word 
documents and files that install Microsoft Office programs. What made it 
difficult to discover was its ability to conceal itself much more effectively 
than other such tools.

Aria-body could attach itself as a parasite to various types of files so that 
it did not have a set pattern of movement. Its operators could change part of 
its code remotely, so that after attacking one computer, Aria-body would look 
different when it breached the next one. Such patterns are often telltale signs 
for security investigators.

“People sometimes fail to see the industrial-strength capacity that China has 
to do this on a global scale,” said Mr. Jennings, the Australian former defense 
official. “We’re talking about tens of thousands of people who are operating in 
their signals intelligence unit and Ministry of State Security. China has both 
the capacity and a long-demonstrated intent to do this wherever it thinks it 
can extract useful information.”

Check Point did not disclose all of the targets it said Naikon had infiltrated, 
but said they included embassies, ministries and state-owned corporations 
dealing with science and technology.

“Throughout our research we found that the group adjusted its signature weapon 
to search for specific files by names within the compromised ministries,” said 
Mr. Finkelstein, the Check Point expert. “This fact alone strengthens the 
understanding that there was a significant, well-thought infrastructure and 
pre-operation intelligence collection.”


Correction: May 7, 2020
An earlier version of this article, using information from  Check Point 
Software Technologies, the cybersecurity company that produced the report on a 
new computer hacking tool, misidentified the Australian target of the Jan. 3 
attack. It was the office of Mark McGowan, the premier of Western Australia, 
not the office of Scott Morrison, the prime minister of Australia.  The error 
was repeated in a picture caption.

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel 
Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s 
Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House.

Steven Lee Myers is the Beijing bureau chief for The New York Times, though he 
was expelled from China in March. He joined The Times in 1989 and has 
previously worked as a correspondent in Moscow, Baghdad and Washington. He is 
the author of “The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin,” published 
by Alfred A. Knopf in 2015. @stevenleemyers • Facebook

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