On 9/6/20 11:10 am, Bernard Robertson-Dunn wrote: > [COVIDSafe is starting to look like yet another simple idea, badly (or > not at all), thought through.
I wrote to Danham Sadler at 08:00, saying: > At a quick glance, the authors seem to have completely overlooked the question of whether the app performs the functions claimed for it. > > There's ample evidence that it doesn't work, and hence analyses of the kind they've published are rather beside the point. > > See: > The Effectiveness of Bluetooth Proximity Apps > in Tracing People with COVID-19 Exposure Risk > http://rogerclarke.com/EC/EBPA.html > > This was reported in a couple of publications: > https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/business-law/we-need-examine-many-narratives-covidsafe-app > https://ia.acs.org.au/article/2020/the-covidsafe-app-and-professional-responsibility.html _______________________ > COVIDSafe ‘extremely limited’: New research > https://www.innovationaus.com/covidsafe-extremely-limited-new-research/ > Denham Sadler > Senior Reporter > 9 June 2020 > > The effectiveness of COVIDSafe is “extremely limited” and the contact > tracing app is unlikely to help prevent the spread of the virus, > according to a new policy paper. > > The paper, written by academics from the Auckland University of > Technology, the University of Queensland, the University of Auckland > and Massey University makes a strong argument for the adoption of the > Google and Apple framework for contact tracing, which provides for a > quicker process that could limit the spread of coronavirus. > > COVIDSafe was launched by the Australian government in April as a way to > assist with manual contact tracing once some social restrictions had > lifted. It uses Bluetooth technology to record contact between users, > with this information stored on the device. > > If a user tests positive for COVID-19, they then consent for this data > to be sent to the national database store, with it then passed on to > state and territory contact tracers. It is primarily designed to assist > manual contact tracing by providing the contact information for people > that a positive case may not have been able to identify, primarily > random people they happen to have close contact with. > > But this centralised model is too slow to effectively combat the spread > of COVID-19, which requires quick isolation of close contacts due to the > virus’ early infection times, the paper found. > > The researchers said that COVID-19 contact tracing “needs to occur at > exceptional speeds to control transmission”, and that COVIDSafe does not > provide for this, meaning authorities are then “very limited in their > ability to achieve control”. > > “These types of enhanced manual tracing apps – such as the Australian > COVIDSafe app – are extremely limited in their ability to speed up > contact tracing,” the paper said. > > “These apps offer more comprehensive contact tracing than manualised > systems alone, but are not expected to greatly enhance speed. Since > speed is the most crucial element for controlling spread of COVID-19, it > is unlikely that these apps can reduce reproduction rates.” > > The researchers argue that the decentralised model for digital contact > tracing, as adopted by Google and Apple in their collaborative > framework, would be more effective due to its speed. > > Under this model, the contact tracing app itself generates an automated > instantaneous notification to users if they have had contact with > another user who has since tested positive for COVID-19. > > This notification would then ideally be followed up by a health official. > > But the Google and Apple framework is at odds with the way COVIDSafe > works, and implementing the API would involve a significant adjustment > of the app. > > The federal government opted for a centralised model where contact > information is sent to a database and then onto state and territory > health authorities, rather than the decentralised model where devices > check against a list of confirmed cases and notify the users directly. > > The Australian government appears unlikely to adopt this model after > recently updating COVIDSafe to improve functionality on Apple devices, > something that had plagued the early rollout of the service. > > Australia and New Zealand currently have vastly different contact > tracing apps in place, something which could impact the ability to open > a trans-Tasman bubble and allow travel between the two countries > significantly earlier than the rest of the world. > > While Australia’s app records contact between its users, New Zealand’s > version records where users have visited, requiring them to scan QR > codes at locations they go to. The two countries have regularly been > sharing information on their different approaches and the potential to > coordinate them, with New Zealand participating in the ministerial council. > > The effectiveness of contact tracing apps relies nearly entirely on > trust in the government, and any negative revelations or lack of > transparency will also impact its effectiveness, the report found. > > “The ethical justification of the app rests upon its capacity to deliver > significant benefits to communities and individuals in ways which > respect legitimate concerns about, for instance, consent, the security > and use of information, the preservation of a role for human judgement > and the possibility that the app will exacerbate existing social > inequalities,” it said. > > “It is possible that a lack of evidence and low uptake will diminish > trust, and have negative spill-over effects to other recommendations > that government might be making in managing the pandemic. > > “This suggests that governments promoting contact tracing apps ought to > ensure that their statements about efficacy are restricted to those that > can be justified by the evidence. > > “While digital contact tracing has distinct advantages, it requires the > right functionality – and enhanced manual tracing apps such as > Australia’s COVIDSafe, which do not enable instantaneous notification, > will not achieve the enhanced speed required for success. > > Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19: A Primer for Policymakers was > funded and developed by researchers and staff at the Centre for Social > Data Analytics. <https://issr.uq.edu.au/files/14448/PolicyPrimer.pdf> > > It was written by academics from the four universities: Rhema > Vaithianathan, Matthew Ryan, Nina Anchugina, Linda Selvey, Tim Dare and > Anna Brown. > -- Roger Clarke mailto:[email protected] T: +61 2 6288 6916 http://www.xamax.com.au http://www.rogerclarke.com Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd 78 Sidaway St, Chapman ACT 2611 AUSTRALIA Visiting Professor in the Faculty of Law University of N.S.W. Visiting Professor in Computer Science Australian National University _______________________________________________ Link mailing list [email protected] http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link
