Major quantum computational breakthrough is shaking up physics and maths

By Ittay Weiss   Senior Lecturer, University of Portsmouth   August 15, 2020
https://theconversation.com/major-quantum-computational-breakthrough-is-shaking-up-physics-and-maths-136634


MIP* = RE is not a typo.  It is a groundbreaking discovery and the catchy title 
of a recent paper in the field of quantum complexity theory.   
(https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.04383)

Complexity theory is a zoo of “complexity classes” – collections of 
computational problems – of which MIP* and RE are but two.  
(https://complexityzoo.uwaterloo.ca/Complexity_Zoo)

The new 165-page paper shows that these two classes are the same. That may seem 
like an insignificant detail in an abstract theory without any real-world 
application. But physicists and mathematicians are flocking to visit the zoo, 
even though they probably don’t understand it all.   
(https://www.quantamagazine.org/mathematicians-grapple-with-sudden-answer-to-connes-embedding-conjecture-20200408/)

Because it turns out the discovery has astonishing consequences for their own 
disciplines.

In 1936, Alan Turing showed that the Halting Problem – algorithmically deciding 
whether a computer program halts or loops forever – cannot be solved. Modern 
computer science was born. Its success made the impression that soon all 
practical problems would yield to the tremendous power of the computer.

But it soon became apparent that, while some problems can be solved 
algorithmically, the actual computation will last long after our Sun will have 
engulfed the computer performing the computation. Figuring out how to solve a 
problem algorithmically was not enough. It was vital to classify solutions by 
efficiency. Complexity theory classifies problems according to how hard it is 
to solve them. The hardness of a problem is measured in terms of how long the 
computation lasts.

RE stands for problems that can be solved by a computer. It is the zoo. Let’s 
have a look at some subclasses.

The class P consists of problems which a known algorithm can solve quickly 
(technically, in polynomial time). For instance, multiplying two numbers 
belongs to P since long multiplication is an efficient algorithm to solve the 
problem. The problem of finding the prime factors of a number is not known to 
be in P; the problem can certainly be solved by a computer but no known 
algorithm can do so efficiently.

A related problem, deciding if a given number is a prime, was in similar limbo 
until 2004 when an efficient algorithm showed that this problem is in P.   
(http://www.cse.iitk.ac.in/users/manindra/algebra/primality_v6.pdf)

Another complexity class is NP. Imagine a maze. “Is there a way out of this 
maze?” is a yes/no question. If the answer is yes, then there is a simple way 
to convince us: simply give us the directions, we’ll follow them, and we’ll 
find the exit. If the answer is no, however, we’d have to traverse the entire 
maze without ever finding a way out to be convinced.

Such yes/no problems for which, if the answer is yes, we can efficiently 
demonstrate that, belong to NP. Any solution to a problem serves to convince us 
of the answer, and so P is contained in NP.

Surprisingly, a million dollar question is whether P=NP. Nobody knows.   
(https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2010/nov/18/win-million-dollars-maths-p-np)

Trust in machines

The classes described so far represent problems faced by a normal computer. But 
computers are fundamentally changing – quantum computers are being developed. 
But if a new type of computer comes along and claims to solve one of our 
problems, how can we trust it is correct?

Picture of computer code.

Complexity science helps explain what problems a computer can solve. 
Phatcharapon/Shutterstock
Imagine an interaction between two entities, an interrogator and a prover. In a 
police interrogation, the prover may be a suspect attempting to prove their 
innocence. The interrogator must decide whether the prover is sufficiently 
convincing. There is an imbalance; knowledge-wise the interrogator is in an 
inferior position.

In complexity theory, the interrogator is the person, with limited 
computational power, trying to solve the problem. The prover is the new 
computer, which is assumed to have immense computational power. An interactive 
proof system is a protocol that the interrogator can use in order to determine, 
at least with high probability, whether the prover should be believed. By 
analogy, these are crimes that the police may not be able to solve, but at 
least innocents can convince the police of their innocence. This is the class 
IP.

If multiple provers can be interrogated, and the provers are not allowed to 
coordinate their answers (as is typically the case when the police interrogates 
multiple suspects), then we get to the class MIP. Such interrogations, via 
cross examining the provers’ responses, provide the interrogator with greater 
power, so MIP contains IP.

Quantum communication is a new form of communication carried out with qubits. 
Entanglement – a quantum feature in which qubits are spookishly entangled, even 
if separated – makes quantum communication fundamentally different to ordinary 
communication. Allowing the provers of MIP to share an entangled qubit leads to 
the class MIP*.

It seems obvious that communication between the provers can only serve to help 
the provers coordinate lies rather than assist the interrogator in discovering 
truth. For that reason, nobody expected that allowing more communication would 
make computational problems more reliable and solvable. Surprisingly, we now 
know that MIP* = RE. This means that quantum communication behaves wildly 
differently to normal communication.

Far-reaching implications

In the 1970s, Alain Connes formulated what became known as the Connes Embedding 
Problem. Grossly simplified, this asked whether infinite matrices can be 
approximated by finite matrices. This new paper has now proved this isn’t 
possible – an important finding for pure mathematicians.

In 1993, meanwhile, Boris Tsirelson pinpointed a problem in physics now known 
as Tsirelson’s Problem. This was about two different mathematical formalisms of 
a single situation in quantum mechanics – to date an incredibly successful 
theory that explains the subatomic world. Being two different descriptions of 
the same phenomenon it was to be expected that the two formalisms were 
mathematically equivalent.

But the new paper now shows that they aren’t. Exactly how they can both still 
yield the same results and both describe the same physical reality is unknown, 
but it is why physicists are also suddenly taking an interest.

Time will tell what other unanswered scientific questions will yield to the 
study of complexity. Undoubtedly, MIP* = RE is a great leap forward.


COMMENTS:

Daniel Ketchum
logged in via Facebook

“It seems obvious”  LOL

13 hours ago
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john lecuyer
logged in via Google

As soon as you get to the most interesting part you end the article.

I’m not sure exactly understand what I just read? but that last part about two 
different formulisms proving the same thing is weird

9 hours ago
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Ittay Weiss (Author)
Senior Lecturer, University of Portsmouth

In reply to john lecuyer

I completely understand the frustration. I’m hope the balance act of getting 
enough detail to make it interesting while not drowning in technicalities did 
not lose too much of the content. To elaborate a bit: it is very often in 
mathematics that very different formalisms prove the essentially the same 
thing. That on its own is not weird. When it comes to physics, and particularly 
quantum mechanics, the mathematical formalism is trying to capture some aspects 
of reality. What this last comment refers to is a particular quantum phenomenon 
that can be formalised mathematically in two different ways. Because they 
formalise the same thing, it was expected that the mathematical formulation 
will also be mathematically equivalent. We now know this is not the case. What 
we don’t know is whether or not the mathematical differences are of physical 
relevance. For example, in classical physics it is commonplace to model the 
world by means of three real coordinates. Doing so is extremely effective 
(e.g., any space mission). Now mathematically though this model of the world 
exhibits very odd phenomena. For instance the Banach-Tarski paradox states that 
it is possible to take a single solid ball of radius 1, split it up into seven 
pieces, rigidly move each of the seven pieces, and at the end of this process 
obtain two distinct solid balls, each of radius 1. However, this is only a 
mathematical construction and not one that can be performed with any kind of 
approximation physically. So, classical physics is quite indifferent to such 
mathematical oddities of this particular model.

9 hours ago
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Cheers,
Stephen

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