This brings up another set of questions from me :)

Under the assumption that hardware eventually fails and I could lose a card... 

If there's two on a guest I assume things seamlessly continue on if one card 
fails?  Do I get messages on Linux, VM, or the HW if that should happen? 

If there's only one and that card fails, does the file system get unmounted 
and/or throw errors?  Or does it continue on and just have issues at next 
reboot? 

Is there any way to test card failure? 

Yes, we have plenty of HA in many forms (tsamp, db2 hadr, external load 
balancers, multiple cecs, multiple servers, multiple data centers, gpfs, etc) 
and they are complex with different recovery times and data loss as you 
mention.   

I'm still in exploration phase so I can't answer the how many are needed.  I'm 
trying to tell mgmt. what we can do with what we have, what it will mean to 
grow it, and what value it provides.   I'm afraid that there is some belief 
that we can "just do all of it".   And what real value is there when the only 
group this buys protection from is our z storage admins (we already have hw 
level to protect devices that leave the datacenter).    Slick marketing 
presentations abound  :) 

From page 6 of this redpiece here 
http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redpapers/pdfs/redp5464.pdf
"IBM Z makes it possible, for the first time, for organizations to pervasively 
encrypt data associated with an entire application, cloud service, or database 
in flight or at rest with one click. "

Still looking for that one click button!
Marcy

-----Original Message-----
From: Linux on 390 Port <LINUX-390@VM.MARIST.EDU> On Behalf Of Reinhard Buendgen
Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2020 12:55 AM
To: LINUX-390@VM.MARIST.EDU
Subject: Re: [LINUX-390] Pervasive disk encryption questions

Tim,

I fully agree. Yet the Z platform is designed for RAS where 
the"R"eliabiity translates to redundancy of the available resources 
either within the system for built-in resources or as an configuration 
option for external resources. The number 680 just reflects the 
recommendation to achieve crypto redundancy per configuration (once 
configured properly the Linux kernel will do the rest).

Whether that form of redundancy is the best form in an specific customer 
environment is up to the customer.

As for the level of redundancy (device redundancy, HA cluster, or DR 
cluster), it is  the customers choice to decide the kind of penalty (ms, 
secs , mins) he or she is willing to accept in case of a the failure of 
a single resource. Also note that for certain workloads (workloads 
managing a shared state,  e.g. R/W data bases), HA clusters may be 
pretty complex and impact performance.

-Reinhard

On 21.01.20 08:59, Timothy Sipples wrote:
> I'd like to comment on the 680 number for a moment. I don't think 680 is
> the correct number of Linux guests that can use protected key
> dm-crypt/LUKS2 encrypted volumes. I'd like to argue the case for why the
> current maximum number is 1,360 guests per machine that can use this
> particular feature. (It's a security feature that doesn't exist on any
> other platform, we should note, so it's either 680 or 1,360 more Linux
> guests than any other machine.)
>
> The number 680 is derived by taking the current maximum number of physical
> Crypto Express features per machine (16), configuring them all in CCA mode,
> multiplying by the current maximum number of domains per feature (85)(*),
> then dividing in half, with the idea being that each Linux guest would
> benefit from the services of two CCA domains spread across two physical
> Crypto Express features.
>
> I think this last assumption is fairly arbitrary. A single Linux guest is
> one kernel running within only one instance of the hypervisor (which may or
> may not be nested). It's a singleton, inherently. In a production
> environment you'd presumably have something more than singleton Linux
> guests running particular workloads, at least if they're important
> workloads. You pick up redundancy there. If a particular Linux guest is
> offline for whatever reason, there's another handling the workload (or
> ready to handle it), with its own Crypto Express domain.
>
> You certainly could decide to add Crypto Express redundancy on a per guest
> basis in addition to whole Linux guest redundancy, but if you're going to
> measure the outer bound maximum number I don't think you ought to assume
> "redundancy squared." It seems rather arbitrary to me that that's where you
> draw that particular line.
>
> There is no intrinsic limit to the number of Linux guests using
> dm-crypt/LUKS2 encrypted volumes with clear keys.
>
> You can also decide on a guest-by-guest basis whether to double up on
> Crypto Express CCA domains or not, which would mean a current upper bound
> limit somewhere between 680 and 1,360 Linux guests using CCA domains.
> And/or you can decide how many Crypto Express features you want to
> configure in another mode, notably EP11. If for example you configure two
> Crypto Express features in EP11 mode, then there are up to 14 available for
> CCA mode, supporting up to 1,190 Linux guests using protected key
> dm-crypt/LUKS2 (up to 595 if you decide to double them all up, or somewhere
> in between if you double up some of them).
>
> Anyway, this is an interesting discussion! If you're pushing these limits
> or at least forecast you will, let IBM know, officially.
>
> (*) This particular number is 40 on IBM z14 ZR1, LinuxONE Rockhopper II,
> and their predecessor models. Adjust the rest of the math accordingly for
> these machine models.
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Timothy Sipples
> IT Architect Executive, Digital Asset & Other Industry Solutions, IBM Z &
> LinuxONE
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> E-Mail: sipp...@sg.ibm.com
>
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