Steve Grubb wrote:
On Wednesday 28 February 2007 09:53, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A malicious root user (or any user wanting to bypass a logging login shell)
could just 'vi /tmp/foo', and then use '!your_command_here -h -x -Q 3' or
whatever they wanted to do. Â
I don't think any security target or standard assumes that you have a
malicious root user. I think that crosses the line from recording what
actions are performed to potential criminal investigation.
In our world, the primary purpose of audit logs is to support a criminal
investigation - and malicious root user is assumed. Two options were
presented: ensure audit files are immutable and if system isn't auditing
shut it down; or put root password under two-man control. (couldn't
accomplish first in time frame, so had to go with second, which is an
incredible pain for the admins - hope to change that with next
generation/selinux).
Probably what's *really* needed is a sebek-style logger that traces all
terminal activity on that connection. http://www.honeynet.org/tools/sebek/
but somebody would have to retarget that code to talk to the audit daemon
rather than an external server on another box.
Yeah, a keylogger is what you'd need and that probably goes beyond what audit
should be doing. If you want to record a lot of data, then you could also
add:
-a always,entry -S execve -F 'auid>=500' -F uid=0
-Steve
Jim
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