On Tue, 2007-05-29 at 10:53 -0400, Alexander Viro wrote:
>       Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH
> records when audit is disabled.  I must admit my stupidity - I assumed
> that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of
> deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held).
> Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way.
> It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those.
> 
>       Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab->gfp_mask for allocations, kmalloc()
> in there is not a problem.  IOW, the simple fix should be sufficient: let's
> rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main record.
> It's trivial to do.  Patch below is against the mainline, rhel5 variant
> is also trivial.
> 
>       Comments?
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index fccc6e5..f3d6e5f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -399,7 +399,6 @@ extern int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
>  extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
>  extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
>  extern int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2);
> -extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
>  extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
>  extern int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user 
> *u_attr);
>  extern int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int 
> msg_prio, const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout);
> @@ -479,7 +478,6 @@ extern int audit_signals;
>  #define audit_socketcall(n,a) ({ 0; })
>  #define audit_fd_pair(n,a) ({ 0; })
>  #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
> -#define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
>  #define audit_set_macxattr(n) do { ; } while (0)
>  #define audit_mq_open(o,m,a) ({ 0; })
>  #define audit_mq_timedsend(d,l,p,t) ({ 0; })
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index e36481e..10e0e6e 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -176,12 +176,6 @@ struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
>       int     fd[2];
>  };
>  
> -struct audit_aux_data_path {
> -     struct audit_aux_data   d;
> -     struct dentry           *dentry;
> -     struct vfsmount         *mnt;
> -};
> -
>  struct audit_aux_data_pids {
>       struct audit_aux_data   d;
>       pid_t                   target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> @@ -657,12 +651,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context 
> *context)
>       struct audit_aux_data *aux;
>  
>       while ((aux = context->aux)) {
> -             if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
> -                     struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
> -                     dput(axi->dentry);
> -                     mntput(axi->mnt);
> -             }
> -
>               context->aux = aux->next;
>               kfree(aux);
>       }
> @@ -998,11 +986,6 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context 
> *context, struct task_struct *ts
>                       audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
>                       break; }
>  
> -             case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
> -                     struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
> -                     audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
> -                     break; }
> -
>               case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
>                       struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
>                       audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], 
> axs->fd[1]);
> @@ -1952,36 +1935,6 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
> - * @dentry: dentry to record
> - * @mnt: mnt to record
> - *
> - * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
> - *
> - * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
> - */
> -int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
> -{
> -     struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
> -     struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
> -
> -     if (likely(!context))
> -             return 0;
> -
> -     ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
> -     if (!ax)
> -             return -ENOMEM;
> -
> -     ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
> -     ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
> -
> -     ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
> -     ax->d.next = context->aux;
> -     context->aux = (void *)ax;
> -     return 0;
> -}
> -
> -/**
>   * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
>   * @sig: signal value
>   * @t: task being signaled
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index e4396a8..2f4c2bb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -570,10 +570,12 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
>               case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
>                       if (a->u.fs.dentry) {
>                               struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.dentry;
> -                             if (a->u.fs.mnt)
> -                                     audit_avc_path(dentry, a->u.fs.mnt);
> -                             audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
> -                             audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, 
> dentry->d_name.name);
> +                             if (a->u.fs.mnt) {
> +                                     audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", dentry, 
> a->u.fs.mnt);
> +                             } else {
> +                                     audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
> +                                     audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, 
> dentry->d_name.name);
> +                             }
>                               inode = dentry->d_inode;
>                       } else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
>                               struct dentry *dentry;
> @@ -624,9 +626,8 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
>                               case AF_UNIX:
>                                       u = unix_sk(sk);
>                                       if (u->dentry) {
> -                                             audit_avc_path(u->dentry, 
> u->mnt);
> -                                             audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
> -                                             audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, 
> u->dentry->d_name.name);
> +                                             audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
> +                                                              u->dentry, 
> u->mnt);
>                                               break;
>                                       }
>                                       if (!u->addr)
> 

Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

--
Linux-audit mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

Reply via email to