On Fri, Sep 28, 2007 at 09:39:57AM -0400, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Friday 28 September 2007 09:31:09 Steve Grubb wrote:
> > > > type=OBJ_PID msg=audit(09/20/2007 15:29:16.355:12775) : opid=2287 ?
> > > > obj=system_u:system_r:xdm_xserver_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
> > >
> > > Er... And what has pid 2287 on that box?
> >
> > I am reasonably certain that its gdm given the selinux label.
>
> Scratch that, I forgot to include "server" in my grep. That looks like Xorg's
> process label. So, its the X server.
OK, I think I see what's going on:
a) we are too cautious about audit_signals; need to exclude rules
that have AUDIT_DEV{MAJOR,MINOR}, AUDIT_INODE, AUDIT_WATCH, AUDIT_PERM.
None of those will trigger on signal-sending syscall
b) more important, we should not touch async signals - basically,
when kernel decides to send SIGIO/SIGURG we obviously should not screw with
current->audit_context. Note that we already have that check, right in the
caller of audit_signal_info() (that is, when we decide if current-based
permissions checks apply). So we simply need to move audit_signal_info()
a bit down - after we'd decided that it's not an async signal and before
the permission checks. Patch below does just that.
diff -urN linux-2.6.22.x86_64/kernel/signal.c foo/kernel/signal.c
--- linux-2.6.22.x86_64/kernel/signal.c 2007-10-01 13:18:10.000000000 -0400
+++ foo/kernel/signal.c 2007-10-01 14:45:35.000000000 -0400
@@ -532,18 +532,18 @@
if (!valid_signal(sig))
return error;
- error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
- if (error)
- return error;
-
- error = -EPERM;
- if ((info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) &&
SI_FROMUSER(info)))
- && ((sig != SIGCONT) ||
- (process_session(current) != process_session(t)))
- && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
- && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
- && !capable(CAP_KILL))
+ if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) &&
SI_FROMUSER(info))) {
+ error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the
signal */
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (((sig != SIGCONT) ||
+ (process_session(current) != process_session(t)))
+ && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
+ && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
+ && !capable(CAP_KILL))
return error;
+ }
return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
}
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