Wouldn't another option be to audit the exec of particular executables you are interested in knowing if someone runs? Obviously you won't know what they are typing into text documents and such, but is that really required? Most places don't allow key loggers at all and it sounds like that's what you've got.
-----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Florian Crouzat Sent: Friday, July 13, 2012 9:51 AM To: Steve Grubb Cc: Thugzclub; [email protected] Subject: EXT :Re: PCI-DSS: Log every root actions/keystrokes but avoid passwords Le 13/07/2012 15:27, Steve Grubb a écrit : > Hmm...I thought I sent an answer. The problem from the kernel's perspective is > that it has no idea what user space is doing. It can't tell a password from > anything else being typed. There is a flag that can be set for the TTY to hide > characters. But the issue then becomes that now you have a loophole that a > crafty admin could use to hide what he's really doing. > > If anyone has ideas on how to improve this, I think we should. > > -Steve Yeah, I was afraid of that... At least, thanks for clarifying. I guess I'll stick with stating: don't fire any real root shell to all my sysadmins in the PCI-DSS scope. (as it's impossible to completely forbid all possible case , eg: forbid sudo -*, sudo sudo *, sudo su * but hell, you can't forbid sudo ./foo.sh where foo fires a shell, there is NOEXEC in sudo but then you can't do anything except reading...) Anyway, I'm getting away of the real matter, avoiding to audit-log passwords keystrokes. -- Cheers, Florian Crouzat -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
