1, remove the permission check of pid namespace. it's no reason to deny un-init pid namespace to operate audit subsystem.
2, only allow init user namespace and init audit namespace to operate list/add/del rule, tty set, trim, make equiv operations. 3, allow audit namespace to get/set audit configuration, send userspace audit message. Signed-off-by: Gao feng <[email protected]> --- kernel/audit.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 095f54d..c4d4291 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -573,11 +573,7 @@ out: static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) { int err = 0; - - /* Only support the initial namespaces for now. */ - if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) || - (task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns)) - return -EPERM; + struct audit_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->audit_ns; switch (msg_type) { case AUDIT_LIST: @@ -586,6 +582,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) return -EOPNOTSUPP; case AUDIT_GET: case AUDIT_SET: + break; case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: case AUDIT_ADD_RULE: case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: @@ -594,13 +591,15 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) case AUDIT_TTY_SET: case AUDIT_TRIM: case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV: - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) + if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) || + (ns != &init_audit_ns) || + !capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) err = -EPERM; break; case AUDIT_USER: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2: - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) + if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) err = -EPERM; break; default: /* bad msg */ -- 1.8.3.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
