On Tuesday, March 7, 2017 4:10:49 PM EST Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > > one possibly audit-worth case which (if I read correctly) this will > > > > > skip is where a setuid-root binary has filecaps which *limit* its > > > > > privs. > > > > > Does that matter? > > > > > > > > I hadn't thought of that case, but I did consider in the setuid case > > > > comparing before and after without setuid forcing the drop of all > > > > capabilities via "ambient". Mind you, this bug has been around before > > > > Luto's patch that adds the ambient capabilities set. > > > > > > Can you suggest a scenario where that might happen? > > > > Sorry, do you mean the case I brought up, or the one you mentioned? I > > don't quite understnad the one you brought up. For mine it's pretty > > simple to reproduce, just > > I was talking about the case you brought up, but they could be the same > case. > > I was thinking of a case where the caps actually change, but are > overridden by the blanket full permissions of setuid.
If there actually is a change in capability bits besides the implied change of capabilities based on the change of the uid alone, then it should be logged. -Steve -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
