There are very important fields necessary to understand who is adding
audit rules and a little more context about the environment in which
its happening. This adds pid, uid, tty, subj, comm, and exe
information to the event. These are required fields.

Signed-off-by: sgrubb <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/audit_watch.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 kernel/auditfilter.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 9eb8b3511636..63abc2ba1372 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -239,14 +239,29 @@ static struct audit_watch *audit_dupe_watch(struct 
audit_watch *old)
 static void audit_watch_log_rule_change(struct audit_krule *r, struct 
audit_watch *w, char *op)
 {
        if (audit_enabled) {
+               struct tty_struct *tty;
+               const struct cred *cred;
                struct audit_buffer *ab;
+               char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
+
                ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
                if (unlikely(!ab))
                        return;
-               audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u op=%s",
-                                from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 
audit_get_loginuid(current)),
-                                audit_get_sessionid(current), op);
-               audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
+
+               tty = audit_get_tty(current);
+               cred = current_cred();
+               audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
+                               task_tgid_nr(current),
+                               from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
+                               from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
+                               audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+                               tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
+                               audit_get_sessionid(current));
+               audit_log_task_context(ab);
+               audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
+               audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
+               audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s path=", op);
                audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
                audit_log_key(ab, r->filterkey);
                audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 0b0aa5854dac..5e2a953da29a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1065,17 +1065,29 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct 
sk_buff_head *q)
 static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int 
res)
 {
        struct audit_buffer *ab;
-       uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
-       unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+       struct tty_struct *tty;
+       const struct cred *cred;
+       char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
 
        if (!audit_enabled)
                return;
 
+       tty = audit_get_tty(current);
+       cred = current_cred();
+
        ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
        if (!ab)
                return;
-       audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid);
+       audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
+                       task_tgid_nr(current),
+                       from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
+                       from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+                       tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
+                       audit_get_sessionid(current));
        audit_log_task_context(ab);
+       audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+       audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
+       audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
        audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", action);
        audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
        audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
-- 
2.13.6


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