On 2018-02-14 11:49, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Wednesday, February 14, 2018 11:18:20 AM EST Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > Audit link denied events were being unexpectedly produced in a disjoint
> > way when audit was disabled, and when they were expected, there were
> > duplicate PATH records.  This patchset addresses both issues for
> > symlinks and hardlinks.
> > 
> > This was introduced with
> >     commit b24a30a7305418ff138ff51776fc555ec57c011a
> >     ("audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK")
> >     commit a51d9eaa41866ab6b4b6ecad7b621f8b66ece0dc
> >     ("fs: add link restriction audit reporting")
> > 
> > Here are the resulting events:
> 
> Have these been tested with ausearch-test?

Not yet.

> > symlink:
> > type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : proctitle=cat
> > my-passwd type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : item=1
> > name=/tmp/my-passwd inode=17618 dev=00:27 mode=link,777 ouid=rgb ogid=rgb
> > rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
> > cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018
> > 04:40:21.635:238) : item=0 name=/tmp inode=13446 dev=00:27
> > mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00
> > obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none
> > cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 type=CWD msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) :
> > cwd=/tmp
> > type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : arch=x86_64
> > syscall=openat success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0xffffff9c
> > a1=0x7ffc6c1acdda a2=O_RDONLY a3=0x0 items=2 ppid=549 pid=606 auid=root
> > uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root
> > fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm= cat exe=/usr/bin/cat
> > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
> > type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : op=follow_link
> > ppid=549 pid=606 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root
> > fsuid=root egid=roo t sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=cat
> > exe=/usr/bin/cat
> > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
> 
> This record duplicates the SYSCALL event except for the op field. I would 
> suggest that is the only field needed.

Agreed, but at the moment, removal of fields isn't possible unless there
is a conflict, and even then the value should simply be corrected if
possible.

> > ----
> > hardlink:
> > type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : proctitle=ln test
> > test-ln type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : item=1
> > name=/tmp inode=13446 dev=00:27 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root
> > rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none
> > cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018
> > 04:40:25.373:239) : item=0 name=test inode=17619 dev=00:27 mode=file,700
> > ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0
> > nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 type=CWD
> > msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : cwd=/tmp
> > type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : arch=x86_64
> > syscall=linkat success=no exit=EPERM(Operation not permitted)
> > a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x7fffe6c3f628 a2=0xffffff9c a3=0x7fffe6c3f62d items=2
> > ppid=578 pid=607 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb
> > egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=3 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln
> > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
> > type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : op=linkat ppid=578
> > pid=607 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb
> > sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=3 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln
> > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
> > 
> > The remaining problem is how to address this when syscall logging is
> > disabled since it needs a parent path record and/or a CWD record to
> > complete it.  It could also use a proctitle record too.  In fact, it
> > looks like we need a way to have multiple auxiliary records to support
> > an arbitrary record.  Comments please.
> 
> Perhaps this can only be emitted correctly with SYSCALL auditing enabled. 
> Otherwise, the event should stand completely on its own without syscall and 
> path records. The information from them can be added, but it risks hitting 
> the record size limit.

As Paul just pointed out (which rang a bell...) in:
        
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/51#issuecomment-365759325
CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is now forced on and if you sabbotage your
audit.rules with -a task,never, your warranty is void.

So now, the lurking questions in the back of my head about the
availability of syscall records has been alleviated and we should always
see a syscall record available unless an audit rule says we are not
interested.

> -Steve
> 
> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/21
> > See also: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/51
> > 
> > Richard Guy Briggs (4):
> >   audit: make ANOM_LINK obey audit_enabled and audit_dummy_context
> >   audit: link denied should not directly generate PATH record
> >   audit: add refused symlink to audit_names
> >   audit: add parent of refused symlink to audit_names
> > 
> >  fs/namei.c     | 10 ++++++++++
> >  kernel/audit.c | 13 ++-----------
> >  2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> 
> 

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <r...@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635

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