On Fri, Nov 1, 2019 at 11:10 AM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2019-10-31 10:50, Steve Grubb wrote: > > Hello, > > > > TLDR; I see a lot of benefit to switching away from procfs for setting > > auid & > > sessionid. > > > > On Wednesday, October 30, 2019 6:03:20 PM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > Also, for the record, removing the audit loginuid from procfs is not > > > > something to take lightly, if at all; like it or not, it's part of the > > > > kernel API. > > > > It can also be used by tools to iterate processes related to one user or > > session. I use this in my Intrusion Prevention System which will land in > > audit user space at some point in the future. > > > > > Oh, I'm quite aware of how important this change is and it was discussed > > > with Steve Grubb who saw the concern and value of considering such a > > > disruptive change. > > > > Actually, I advocated for syscall. I think the gist of Eric's idea was that > > / > > proc is the intersection of many nasty problems. By relying on it, you can't > > simplify the API to reduce the complexity. Almost no program actually needs > > access to /proc. ps does. But almost everything else is happy without it. > > For > > example, when you setup chroot jails, you may have to add /dev/random or / > > dev/null, but almost never /proc. What does force you to add /proc is any > > entry point daemon like sshd because it needs to set the loginuid. If we > > switch away from /proc, then sshd or crond will no longer /require/ procfs > > to > > be available which again simplifies the system design. > > > > > Removing proc support for auid/ses would be a > > > long-term deprecation if accepted. > > > > It might need to just be turned into readonly for a while. But then again, > > perhaps auid and session should be part of /proc/<pid>/status? Maybe this > > can > > be done independently and ahead of the container work so there is a > > migration > > path for things that read auid or session. TBH, maybe this should have been > > done from the beginning. > > How about making loginuid/contid/capcontid writable only via netlink but > still provide the /proc interface for reading? Deprecation of proc can > be left as a decision for later. This way sshd/crond/getty don't need > /proc, but the info is still there for tools that want to read it.
Just so there is no confusion for the next patchset: I think it would be a mistake to include any changes to loginuid in your next patchset, even as a "RFC" at the end. Also, barring some shocking comments from Eric relating to the imminent death of /proc in containers, I think it would also be a mistake to include the netlink API. Let's keep it small and focused :) -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
