On Mon, 2016-06-27 at 07:35 +0300, Andrei Borzenkov wrote:
> The problem is that current implementation of RAID56 puts exactly CoW
> data at risk. I.e. writing new (copy of) data may suddenly make old
> (copy of) data inaccessible, even though it had been safely committed
> to
> disk and is now in read-only snapshot.

Sure,... mine was just a general thing to be added.
No checksums => no way to tell which block is valid in case of silent
block errors => no way to recover unless by chance

=> should be included as a warning, especially as userland software
starts to automatically set nodatacow (IIRC systemd does so), thereby
silently breaking functionality (integrity+recoverability) assumed by
the user.


Cheers,
Chris-

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