> On Jun 17, 2017, at 10:23 AM, Jeffrey Walton <noloa...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 11:45 PM, Lee Duncan <ldun...@suse.com> wrote:
>> On 06/16/2017 05:41 PM, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>>> Hi Lee,
>>> On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 11:58 PM, Lee Duncan <ldun...@suse.com> wrote:
>>>> It seems like what you are doing is basically "good", i.e. if there is
>>>> not enough random data, don't use it. But what happens in that case? The
>>>> authentication fails? How does the user know to wait and try again?
>>> The process just remains in interruptible (kill-able) sleep until
>>> there is enough entropy, so the process doesn't need to do anything.
>>> If the waiting is interrupted by a signal, it returns -ESYSRESTART,
>>> which follows the usual semantics of restartable syscalls.
>> In your testing, how long might a process have to wait? Are we talking
>> seconds? Longer? What about timeouts?
>> Sorry, but your changing something that isn't exactly broken, so I just
>> want to be sure we're not introducing some regression, like clients
>> can't connect the first 5 minutes are a reboot.
> CHAP (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1994.txt) and iSCSI
> (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3720.txt) require random values. If iSCSI
> is operating without them, it seems like something is broken. From RFC
> 3720, Section 8.2.1, CHAP Considerations:
>   When CHAP is performed over a non-encrypted channel, it is vulnerable
>   to an off-line dictionary attack.  Implementations MUST support use
>   of up to 128 bit random CHAP secrets, including the means to generate
>   such secrets and to accept them from an external generation source.
>   Implementations MUST NOT provide secret generation (or expansion)
>   means other than random generation.

That only applies to the generation of the secret, which is configured into 
iscsi, not created by it.  A utility to generate the secret might be supplied, 
of course, just as one might have utilities to generate strong passwords, but 
it's not a component of the iSCSI protocol.

> CHAP actually has a weaker requirement since it only requires _unique_
> (and not _random_). From RFC 1994, Section 2.3, Design Requirements:
>   Each challenge value SHOULD be unique, since repetition of a
>   challenge value in conjunction with the same secret would permit an
>   attacker to reply with a previously intercepted response.  Since it
>   is expected that the same secret MAY be used to authenticate with
>   servers in disparate geographic regions, the challenge SHOULD exhibit
>   global and temporal uniqueness.
> But its not clear to me how to ensure uniqueness when its based on
> randomness from the generators.

A strong RNG of length n will produce numbers likely to be unique until you 
approach the birtday limit 2^(n/2).  So, say, a 128 bit challenge will be 


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