In case the caller provides an SG with zero data, prevent a kmap of the
page pointed to by the SG. In this case, it is possible that the page
does not exist.
This fixes a crash in authenc() when the plaintext is zero and thus the
encryption operation is a noop. In this case, no input data exists that
can be hashed. The crash is triggerable via AF_ALG from unprivileged
user space.
Fixes: 3b2f6df08258e ("crypto: hash - Export shash through ahash")
CC: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
---
crypto/shash.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/shash.c b/crypto/shash.c
index 5e31c8d776df..32d0e1806bf4 100644
--- a/crypto/shash.c
+++ b/crypto/shash.c
@@ -278,9 +278,11 @@ int shash_ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *req, struct
shash_desc *desc)
struct scatterlist *sg = req->src;
unsigned int offset = sg->offset;
unsigned int nbytes = req->nbytes;
+ unsigned int process = min(sg->length,
+ ((unsigned int)(PAGE_SIZE)) - offset);
int err;
- if (nbytes < min(sg->length, ((unsigned int)(PAGE_SIZE)) - offset)) {
+ if (process && nbytes < process) {
void *data;
data = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg));
--
2.13.5
