Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> writes: > There continue to be unexpected security exposures when users have access > to CLONE_NEWUSER.
So how does this sucessfully address that issue? > For admins of systems that do not use user namespaces > and are running distro kernels with CONFIG_USER_NS enabled, there is > no way to disable CLONE_NEWUSER. This provides a way for sysadmins to > disable the feature to reduce their attack surface without needing to > rebuild their kernels. > > This is inspired by a similar restriction in Grsecurity, but adds > a sysctl. > I have already nacked this patch. Thank you for removing the broken capability in sysctl check. But this does not address any of the other issues I have raised. Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebied...@xmission.com> Further as far as I can tell this is just about a witch hunt. Isn't that what you call a campaign against something when the complaining party does not understand something persecutes it and does not bother to try and understand? I have already told you what kind of direction would be acceptable. I gave concrete suggests and here you are wasting our time with this patch again. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
