On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:07:23AM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > On Thu, 13 Jun 2019 at 21:04, Jarkko Sakkinen > <jarkko.sakki...@linux.intel.com> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 04:00:32PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > > > Provide documentation for usage of TEE based Trusted Keys via existing > > > user-space "keyctl" utility. Also, document various use-cases. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.g...@linaro.org> > > > > Sorry missed this patch. Anyway, I don't think we want multiple trusted > > keys subsystems. You have to fix the existing one if you care to get > > these changes in. There is no really other way around this. > > > > I understand your point. > > When I initially looked at trusted key implementation, it seemed to be > tightly coupled to use TPM device. So I implemented a parallel > implementation to get initial feedback (functionality-wise) on this > new approach.
Yeah, I completely get this. My feedback this is: we can definitely consider TEE based trusted keys, and I know that trusted.ko is a mess, but still that is the only right long-term path. Think about the positive side: if you as a side-effect can make it cleaner and more versatile, your patch set will improve the quality of the kernel as a whole i.e. you benefit larger audience than just TEE user base :-) > I will work on abstraction of trusted key apis to use either approach. > But is it fine with you if I send if I send a separate RFC patch for > abstraction and later once reviewed I will incorporate that patch in > this patch-set. > > It will be really helpful if you could help to test that abstraction > patch with a real TPM device as I doesn't posses one to test. I can, yes. /Jarkko