On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 09:40:21AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > I skimmed this and a couple things jumped out at me. > > 1) PGP and S/MIME because of their use of long term keys do not provide > forward secrecy. Which can makes it worth while to cryptographically > factor a key or to obtain knowledge of a private key without the key > holders knowledge. As the keys will be used again and again over a > long period of time.
Secrecy over a "long period of time" is not what is needed here. 6 months max is what I have seen, why would you need longer? > More recent protocol's such as Signal's Double Ratchet Protocol > enable forward secrecy for store and foward communications, and > remove the problem of long term keys. And how does that work with email? We need something that actually works with a tool that everyone can use for development (i.e. email) > 2) The existence of such a process with encrypted communications to > ensure long term confidentiality is going to make our contact people > the targets of people who want access to knolwedge about hardware > bugs like meltdown, before they become public. Why are those same people not "targets" today? And again, it's not long-term. > I am just mentioning these things in case they are not immediately > obvious to everyone else involved, so that people can be certain > they are comfortable with the tradeoffs being made. I know of no other thing that actually works (and lots of people can't even get PGP to work as they use foolish email clients.) Do you? thanks, greg k-h