From: Roman Kisel <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, June 3, 2025 5:44 PM > > When the confidential VMBus is available, the guest should post > messages via the paravisor. > > Update hv_post_message() to request posting messages from the paravisor
"via the paravisor"? I'm not sure what "from the paravisor" means. And you used "via" in the previous sentence and patch Subject. > rather than through GHCB or TD calls. > > Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <[email protected]> > --- > drivers/hv/hv.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv.c b/drivers/hv/hv.c > index e25c91eb6af5..1f7cf1244509 100644 > --- a/drivers/hv/hv.c > +++ b/drivers/hv/hv.c > @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int hv_post_message(union hv_connection_id connection_id, > aligned_msg->payload_size = payload_size; > memcpy((void *)aligned_msg->payload, payload, payload_size); > > - if (ms_hyperv.paravisor_present) { > + if (ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && !vmbus_is_confidential()) { Does this change make post_msg_page unnecessary when Confidential VMBus is present? When using Confidential VMBus, the code path will be to use a normal hypercall, which will go to the paravisor, and hence doesn't need decrypted memory. If my thinking is correct, the code in hv_synic_alloc() could be updated to not allocate post_msg_page when vmbus_is_confidential(). > if (hv_isolation_type_tdx()) > status = hv_tdx_hypercall(HVCALL_POST_MESSAGE, > virt_to_phys(aligned_msg), 0); > -- > 2.43.0
