On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:15:39PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
> state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
> support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
> them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.
> 
> For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the
> initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |   11 +++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h     |    3 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |   30 ++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    9 ++++
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   77 
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Some cleanups ontop in case you get to send v7:

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h 
b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 61a704945294..5959a42dd4d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -45,13 +45,8 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t 
paddr,
 {
 }
 
-static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
-{
-}
+static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)       { }
+static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)     { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 2321f05045e5..32ebbe0ab04d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char 
*real_mode_data, bool map)
        struct boot_params *boot_data;
        unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
 
+       /* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
+       if (!sme_active())
+               return;
+
        __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), map);
        boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
 
@@ -142,40 +146,22 @@ static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char 
*real_mode_data, bool map)
        cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
                        ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
 
-       if (cmdline_paddr)
-               __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr),
-                                         COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map);
+       if (!cmdline_paddr)
+               return;
+
+       __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map);
+
+       sme_early_pgtable_flush();
 }
 
 void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 {
-       /* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
-       if (!sme_active())
-               return;
-
-       /*
-        * The bootdata and command line aren't needed anymore so clear
-        * any mapping of them.
-        */
        __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
-
-       sme_early_pgtable_flush();
 }
 
 void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 {
-       /* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
-       if (!sme_active())
-               return;
-
-       /*
-        * The bootdata and command line will not be encrypted, so they
-        * need to be mapped as decrypted memory so they can be copied
-        * properly.
-        */
        __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
-
-       sme_early_pgtable_flush();
 }
 
 void __init sme_early_init(void)

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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