SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked
as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO should be mapped as 'unencrypted' so that both
guest and hypervisor can access the data.Fixes: 1379edd59673 (x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted ...) Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # 4.15.x Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index 77873ce..5f2eb32 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va) if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB)) flags |= _PAGE_PCD; - if (sev_active()) + if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO) flags |= _PAGE_ENC; pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
