On Tue, Jan 21, 2020 at 04:30:15PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 02:31:59PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> > > > > If userspace provides an invalid fscrypt no-key filename which encodes a > > hash value with any of the UBIFS node type bits set (i.e. the high 3 > > bits), gracefully report ENOENT rather than triggering ubifs_assert(). > > > > Test case with kvm-xfstests shell: > > > > . fs/ubifs/config > > . ~/xfstests/common/encrypt > > dev=$(__blkdev_to_ubi_volume /dev/vdc) > > ubiupdatevol $dev -t > > mount $dev /mnt -t ubifs > > mkdir /mnt/edir > > xfs_io -c set_encpolicy /mnt/edir > > rm /mnt/edir/_,,,,,DAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA > > > > With the bug, the following assertion fails on the 'rm' command: > > > > [ 19.066048] UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 379): ubifs_assert_failed: UBIFS > > assert failed: !(hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK), in fs/ubifs/key.h:170 > > > > Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames") > > Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.10+ > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> > > Richard, can you review the two UBIFS patches in this series, and if you're > okay > with them, provide Acked-by's so that we can take them through the fscrypt > tree? > They don't conflict with anything currently in the UBIFS tree. >
Richard, any objection to us taking these patches through the fscrypt tree? - Eric _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
