On 5/13/24 00:27, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi wrote:
> Eric Biggers <ebigg...@kernel.org> writes:
>
>> On Fri, Apr 05, 2024 at 03:13:26PM +0300, Eugen Hristev wrote:
>
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + decrypted_name.name = kmalloc(de_name_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> + if (!decrypted_name.name)
>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>> + res = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(parent, 0, 0, &encrypted_name,
>>> + &decrypted_name);
>>> + if (res < 0)
>>> + goto out;
>>
>> If fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() returns an error and
>> !sb_has_strict_encoding(sb),
>> then this function returns 0 (indicating no match) instead of the error code
>> (indicating an error). Is that the correct behavior? I would think that
>> strict_encoding should only have an effect on the actual name
>> comparison.
>
> No. we *want* this return code to be propagated back to f2fs. In ext4 it
> wouldn't matter since the error is not visible outside of ext4_match,
> but f2fs does the right thing and stops the lookup.
In the previous version which I sent, you told me that the error should be
propagated only in strict_mode, and if !strict_mode, it should just return no
match.
Originally I did not understand that this should be done only for
utf8_strncasecmp
errors, and not for all the errors. I will change it here to fix that.
>
> Thinking about it, there is a second problem with this series.
> Currently, if we are on strict_mode, f2fs_match_ci_name does not
> propagate unicode errors back to f2fs. So, once a utf8 invalid sequence
> is found during lookup, it will be considered not-a-match but the lookup
> will continue. This allows some lookups to succeed even in a corrupted
> directory. With this patch, we will abort the lookup on the first
> error, breaking existing semantics. Note that these are different from
> memory allocation failure and fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr. For those, it
> makes sense to abort.
So , in the case of f2fs , we must not propagate utf8 errors ? It should just
return no match even in strict mode ?
If this helper is common for both f2fs and ext4, we have to do the same for
ext4 ?
Or we are no longer able to commonize the code altogether ?
>
> Also, once patch 6 and 7 are added, if fscrypt fails with -EINVAL for
> any reason unrelated to unicode (like in the WARN_ON above), we will
> incorrectly print the error message saying there is a bad UTF8 string.
>
> My suggestion would be to keep the current behavior. Make
> generic_ci_match only propagate non-unicode related errors back to the
> filesystem. This means that we need to move the error messages in patch
> 6 and 7 into this function, so they only trigger when utf8_strncasecmp*
> itself fails.
>
So basically unicode errors stop here, and print the error message here in that
case.
Am I understanding it correctly ?
>>> + /*
>>> + * Attempt a case-sensitive match first. It is cheaper and
>>> + * should cover most lookups, including all the sane
>>> + * applications that expect a case-sensitive filesystem.
>>> + */
>>> + if (folded_name->name) {
>>> + if (dirent.len == folded_name->len &&
>>> + !memcmp(folded_name->name, dirent.name, dirent.len))
>>> + goto out;
>>> + res = utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, folded_name, &dirent);
>>
>> Shouldn't the memcmp be done with the original user-specified name, not the
>> casefolded name? I would think that the user-specified name is the one
>> that's
>> more likely to match the on-disk name, because of case preservation. In most
>> cases users will specify the same case on both file creation and later
>> access.
>
> Yes.
>
so the utf8_strncasecmp_folded call here must use name->name instead of
folded_name ?
Thanks for the review
Eugen
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