On Thu, Apr 12, 2007 at 03:32:08PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Miklos Szeredi ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> > From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > 
> > If CLONE_NEWNS and CLONE_NEWNS_USERMNT are given to clone(2) or
> > unshare(2), then allow user mounts within the new namespace.

> > This is not flexible enough, because user mounts can't be enabled for
> > the initial namespace.
> > 
> > The remaining clone bits also getting dangerously few...

ATM I think we do not have that many CLONE flags
available, so that this feature will have to wait
for a clone2/64 or similar ...

> > Alternatives are:
> > 
> >   - prctl() flag
> >   - setting through the containers filesystem

> Sorry, I know I had mentioned it, but this is definately my least
> favorite approach.
> 
> Curious whether are any other suggestions/opinions from the containers
> list?

question: how is mounting filesystems (loopback,
fuse, etc) secured in such way that the user
cannot 'create' device nodes with 'unfortunate'
permissions?

TIA,
Herbert

> thanks,
> -serge
> 
> > Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > ---
> > 
> > Index: linux/fs/namespace.c
> > ===================================================================
> > --- linux.orig/fs/namespace.c       2007-04-12 13:46:19.000000000 +0200
> > +++ linux/fs/namespace.c    2007-04-12 13:54:36.000000000 +0200
> > @@ -1617,6 +1617,8 @@ struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(int fl
> >             return ns;
> > 
> >     new_ns = dup_mnt_ns(ns, new_fs);
> > +   if (new_ns && (flags & CLONE_NEWNS_USERMNT))
> > +           new_ns->flags |= MNT_NS_PERMIT_USERMOUNTS;
> > 
> >     put_mnt_ns(ns);
> >     return new_ns;
> > Index: linux/include/linux/sched.h
> > ===================================================================
> > --- linux.orig/include/linux/sched.h        2007-04-12 13:26:48.000000000 
> > +0200
> > +++ linux/include/linux/sched.h     2007-04-12 13:54:36.000000000 +0200
> > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
> >  #define CLONE_STOPPED              0x02000000      /* Start in stopped 
> > state */
> >  #define CLONE_NEWUTS               0x04000000      /* New utsname group? */
> >  #define CLONE_NEWIPC               0x08000000      /* New ipcs */
> > +#define CLONE_NEWNS_USERMNT        0x10000000      /* Allow user mounts in 
> > ns? */
> > 
> >  /*
> >   * Scheduling policies
> > Index: linux/kernel/fork.c
> > ===================================================================
> > --- linux.orig/kernel/fork.c        2007-04-11 18:27:46.000000000 +0200
> > +++ linux/kernel/fork.c     2007-04-12 13:59:10.000000000 +0200
> > @@ -1586,7 +1586,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unshare(unsigned lon
> >     err = -EINVAL;
> >     if (unshare_flags & ~(CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_FS|CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_SIGHAND|
> >                             CLONE_VM|CLONE_FILES|CLONE_SYSVSEM|
> > -                           CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC))
> > +                           CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWNS_USERMNT))
> >             goto bad_unshare_out;
> > 
> >     if ((err = unshare_thread(unshare_flags)))
> > 
> > --
> > -
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