While testing for places where zero-sized destinations were still showing up in the kernel, sock_copy() was found, which is using very specific memcpy() offsets for both avoiding a portion of struct sock, and copying beyond the end of it (since struct sock is really just a common header before the protocol-specific allocation). Instead of trying to unravel this historical lack of container_of(), just switch to unsafe_memcpy(), since that's effectively what was happening already (memcpy() wasn't checking 0-sized destinations while the code base was being converted away from fake flexible arrays).
Avoid the following false positive warning with future changes to CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE: memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 3068) of destination "&nsk->__sk_common.skc_dontcopy_end" at net/core/sock.c:2057 (size 0) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> --- Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] --- net/core/sock.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 0a7f46c37f0c..b7ea358eb18f 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -2053,8 +2053,9 @@ static void sock_copy(struct sock *nsk, const struct sock *osk) memcpy(nsk, osk, offsetof(struct sock, sk_dontcopy_begin)); - memcpy(&nsk->sk_dontcopy_end, &osk->sk_dontcopy_end, - prot->obj_size - offsetof(struct sock, sk_dontcopy_end)); + unsafe_memcpy(&nsk->sk_dontcopy_end, &osk->sk_dontcopy_end, + prot->obj_size - offsetof(struct sock, sk_dontcopy_end), + /* alloc is larger than struct, see sk_prot_alloc() */); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK nsk->sk_security = sptr; -- 2.34.1
