Applied with small changes, thanks. https://github.com/chenhuacai/linux/commit/a55a07439613689f0890c9482b9c5f76dec255dd
Huacai On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 11:09 AM Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]> wrote: > > Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall, > the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(). > > In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and > slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to > disable stack protector for do_syscall() at function level. > > With this patch, the REPORT_STACK test show that: > `loongarch64 bits of stack entropy: 7` > > Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]> > Suggested-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]> > --- > v2: > - get_random_u16() -> drdtime(). > - Add Suggested-by. > --- > arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- > 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig > index ddc042895d01..fcf6451b4e38 100644 > --- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig > @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ config LOONGARCH > select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE > select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if PERF_EVENTS > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU > + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP > select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER > select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK > diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c > index ec17cd5163b7..9df81197a09b 100644 > --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c > +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c > @@ -9,11 +9,13 @@ > #include <linux/entry-common.h> > #include <linux/errno.h> > #include <linux/linkage.h> > +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > #include <linux/unistd.h> > > #include <asm/asm.h> > #include <asm/exception.h> > +#include <asm/loongarch.h> > #include <asm/signal.h> > #include <asm/switch_to.h> > #include <asm-generic/syscalls.h> > @@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ void *sys_call_table[__NR_syscalls] = { > typedef long (*sys_call_fn)(unsigned long, unsigned long, > unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); > > -void noinstr do_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs) > +__no_stack_protector void noinstr do_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs) > { > unsigned long nr; > sys_call_fn syscall_fn; > @@ -55,11 +57,24 @@ void noinstr do_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs) > > nr = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, nr); > > + add_random_kstack_offset(); > + > if (nr < NR_syscalls) { > syscall_fn = sys_call_table[nr]; > regs->regs[4] = syscall_fn(regs->orig_a0, regs->regs[5], > regs->regs[6], > regs->regs[7], regs->regs[8], > regs->regs[9]); > } > > + /* > + * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10 > + * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler > + * when applying stack alignment constraints: 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) > + * aligned, which will remove the 4 low bits from any entropy chosen > + * here. > + * > + * The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4]. > + */ > + choose_random_kstack_offset(drdtime()); > + > syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs); > } > -- > 2.34.1 >
