From: Kameron Carr <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, November 11, 2026 2:37 PM > > On 11/11/2026 10:01 AM, Michael Kelley wrote: > > From: Kameron Carr <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, October > > 30, 2026 5:14 PM > >> > >> In hv_common_cpu_init(), the per-CPU hypercall input/output pages need > >> to be marked as decrypted (shared) for confidential VM isolation types. > >> This is already done for SNP and TDX isolation; extend the same handling > >> to Arm CCA Realm guests so that the host hypervisor can access the > >> shared hypercall buffers. > >> > >> is_realm_world() is declared in include/linux/arm-rsi-cmds.h which only > >> builds on arm64 (it includes <asm/memory.h>), so using it directly in > >> the arch-neutral drivers/hv/hv_common.c would break the x86 build. > >> Introduce a Hyper-V-specific helper following the established > >> hv_isolation_type_snp() / hv_isolation_type_tdx() pattern. > >> > >> On architectures other than arm64 the weak default keeps the existing > >> behaviour. > >> > >> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]> > >> Signed-off-by: Kameron Carr <[email protected]> > >> --- > >> arch/arm64/hyperv/mshyperv.c | 5 +++++ > >> drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- > >> include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 1 + > >> 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > >> > >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/hyperv/mshyperv.c b/arch/arm64/hyperv/mshyperv.c > >> index 46ab2da..da6c3aa0 100644 > >> --- a/arch/arm64/hyperv/mshyperv.c > >> +++ b/arch/arm64/hyperv/mshyperv.c > >> @@ -182,3 +182,8 @@ bool hv_is_hyperv_initialized(void) > >> return hyperv_initialized; > >> } > >> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_is_hyperv_initialized); > >> + > >> +bool hv_isolation_type_cca(void) > >> +{ > >> + return is_realm_world(); > >> +} > >> diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv_common.c b/drivers/hv/hv_common.c > >> index 31256cb..a60c92c 100644 > >> --- a/drivers/hv/hv_common.c > >> +++ b/drivers/hv/hv_common.c > >> @@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ int hv_common_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu) > >> u64 msr_vp_index; > >> gfp_t flags; > >> const int pgcount = hv_output_page_exists() ? 2 : 1; > >> + const size_t alloc_size = ALIGN((size_t)pgcount * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, > >> PAGE_SIZE); > >> void *mem; > >> int ret = 0; > >> > >> @@ -489,7 +490,7 @@ int hv_common_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu) > >> * online and then taken offline > >> */ > >> if (!*inputarg) { > >> - mem = kmalloc_array(pgcount, HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, flags); > >> + mem = kmalloc(alloc_size, flags); > >> if (!mem) > >> return -ENOMEM; > >> > >> @@ -499,14 +500,16 @@ int hv_common_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu) > >> } > >> > >> if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && > >> - (hv_isolation_type_snp() || hv_isolation_type_tdx())) { > >> - ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)mem, pgcount); > >> + (hv_isolation_type_snp() || hv_isolation_type_tdx() || > >> + hv_isolation_type_cca())) { > > > > Could this big "if" statement use "hv_is_isolation_supported()" instead > > of explicitly testing for each CoCo VM type? I ask partly because > > Mukesh Rathor has just submitted a patch [1] that introduces a new > > function that does something almost exactly the same as > > hv_is_isolation_supported() and uses it here. > > > > You don't provide the non-stub hv_is_isolation_supported() until > > Patch 6 of this series, but the weak stub should allow everything to > > build if a bisection splits this patch series. > > Including your response to Mukesh for context: > > Any reason not to use hv_is_isolation_supported()? Your > > new function seems conceptually equivalent, though at a > > detailed level it handles VBS isolation differently from > > hv_is_isolation_supported(). But I don't think including > > VBS isolation here is a problem since set_memory_decrypted() > > is a no-op with VBS isolation. > > I'm not fully convinced that calling set_memory_decrypted() is always a > no-op for VBS. > > I see that on VBS VMs, ms_hyperv_init_platform() calls hv_vtom_init(). > If set_memory_decrypted() calls hv_mark_gpa_visibility(), you will try > to use the inputarg before it has been initialized. > > Please let me know if my understanding is incorrect.
You are right. In general, it *is* okay to call set_memory_decrypted/encrypted() with VBS isolation. The decrypt/encrypt paths go through all the normal machinery, including making the Hyper-V hypercalls. But the net result is no change in the guest. PTEs remain unchanged and the vTOM bit is not added to physical addresses. In that sense, it is a no-op, which is what I was remembering. But in this case, that doesn't work because of the scenario you point out. This call to set_memory_decrypted() must be skipped for VBS isolation. I may do a small patch to add a comment to the code here identifying this as an exception. The fully-enlightened (no paravisor) cases for SNP and TDX are good because they don't call hv_vtom_init(). In those cases, set_memory_decrypted() uses the "native" callbacks to update the hypervisor. Those native callbacks don't know anything about Hyper-V or the per-cpu input page, and so don't have the chicken-and-egg problem that VBS isolation has. I need to go review again how all this works for CCA. :-) Thanks, Michael
