On Mon, 2007-02-05 at 21:24 +0200, Peter wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Feb 2007, Oded Arbel wrote:
> 
> > That doesn't work with simple session only encryption, and what I don't
> > understand is how they both offer assurance and deniability, if the next
> > time I'm talking with the same guy I can be assured of his identity but
> > he can later claim that it wasn't him.
> 
> Think about how the unique session key is generated: a pubilc key 
> exchange occurs, with or without second factor authentication (on the 
> phone as you said), then a session key is generated and used based on 
> this. The session key is used only once and then destroyed. The next 
> time you connect you cannot in theory know that you are talking to the 
> same person without using the second factor again imho (otherwise you 
> are relying on communication possibly crypted with a private public key 
> sent during the second factor communication). Deniability relies on both 
> sides destroying the session keys immediately after use, the server not 
> storing or saving any. After the fact, only a lie detector can find out 
> if you did talk to the other guy. Of course anybody having run a packet 
> sniffer all the time on either connection (and having listened in on the 
> phone) will only pretend to be using the lie detector since he already 
> knows what he needs to know.

You seem to imply that with off-the-record, both a third party that has
access to the entire session can prove the identity of at least one side
of it (destroying deniability) and that on a second session one cannot
be assured of the identity of the other person w/o again performing
manual verification (destroying authentication). 
So you are essentially calling the OTR guys liars, right ?

--
Oded
::..
"He looked a lot bigger when I didn't see him"
    -- Jayne (Adam Baldwin), "Firefly"



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