Andreas Schwab wrote:
I realize the program under ptrace is no longer running setuid, but it is still running,Tom Horsley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
If I exec a setuid program under ptrace, I can read the image via
PEEKDATA requests.
Only CAP_SYS_PTRACE capable processes get suid/sgid semantics under ptrace, or can attach to a privileged processes.
Andreas.
and the debugger can examine the process memory. With most setuid programs
being installed execute-only with no read access, isn't it a security problem that
I can get read access anyway (at least to the parts of the file that are in LOAD
segments)?
(Although I do notice that my suse 9.2 system has /usr/bin/sudo installed readable -
it is only my fedora core 3 system that has it execute only - just to pick a sample
setuid program).
Maybe setuid shouldn't even be the question, maybe the issue should be that ptrace can read parts of program files that have no read access.
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