The information exposed by FIBMAP is not privileged and is similar to the information provided by FIEMAP, which does not require privileges. According to [1] the reason the capability check was originally added was to prevent crashing the kernel by passing invalid arguments, but this should no longer be a problem, so this requirement can be removed.
[1] http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/linux/kernel/103611 Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <se...@hallyn.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <ty...@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.fors...@canonical.com> --- fs/ioctl.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ioctl.c b/fs/ioctl.c index 5d01d2638ca5..c963d82b0de8 100644 --- a/fs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/ioctl.c @@ -55,8 +55,6 @@ static int ioctl_fibmap(struct file *filp, int __user *p) /* do we support this mess? */ if (!mapping->a_ops->bmap) return -EINVAL; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) - return -EPERM; res = get_user(block, p); if (res) return res; -- 1.9.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
