I think hackers chould build a malicious h323 packet to overflow
the pointer p which will panic during the memcpy(addr, p, len)
For example, he may fabricate a very large taddr->ipAddress.ip;
As suggested by Eric, this module is protected by a lock (nf_h323_lock)
so adding a variable h323_buffer_valid_bytes that would contain
the number of valid bytes would not require to change prototypes of
get_h2x5_addr.
Signed-off-by: Zhouyi Zhou <yizhouz...@ict.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.duma...@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtyl...@cogentembedded.com>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c
b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c
index 9511af0..65d84bc 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c
@@ -110,6 +110,11 @@ int (*nat_q931_hook) (struct sk_buff *skb,
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(nf_h323_lock);
static char *h323_buffer;
+static unsigned int h323_buffer_valid_bytes;
+/* check offset overflow and out of range data reference */
+#define CHECK_BOUND(p, n) ((n) > h323_buffer_valid_bytes || \
+ ((void *)(p) + (n) - (void *)h323_buffer \
+ > h323_buffer_valid_bytes))
static struct nf_conntrack_helper nf_conntrack_helper_h245;
static struct nf_conntrack_helper nf_conntrack_helper_q931[];
@@ -145,6 +150,7 @@ static int get_tpkt_data(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int
protoff,
if (*data == NULL) { /* first TPKT */
/* Get first TPKT pointer */
+ h323_buffer_valid_bytes = tcpdatalen;
tpkt = skb_header_pointer(skb, tcpdataoff, tcpdatalen,
h323_buffer);
BUG_ON(tpkt == NULL);
@@ -247,6 +253,9 @@ static int get_h245_addr(struct nf_conn *ct, const unsigned
char *data,
return 0;
}
+ if (CHECK_BOUND(p, len + sizeof(__be16)))
+ return 0;
+
memcpy(addr, p, len);
memset((void *)addr + len, 0, sizeof(*addr) - len);
memcpy(port, p + len, sizeof(__be16));
@@ -669,6 +678,9 @@ int get_h225_addr(struct nf_conn *ct, unsigned char *data,
return 0;
}
+ if (CHECK_BOUND(p, len + sizeof(__be16)))
+ return 0;
+
memcpy(addr, p, len);
memset((void *)addr + len, 0, sizeof(*addr) - len);
memcpy(port, p + len, sizeof(__be16));
@@ -1248,6 +1260,7 @@ static unsigned char *get_udp_data(struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int protoff,
if (dataoff >= skb->len)
return NULL;
*datalen = skb->len - dataoff;
+ h323_buffer_valid_bytes = *datalen;
return skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, *datalen, h323_buffer);
}
--
1.9.1
