3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Ryan Ware <[email protected]> commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream. This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq(). Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized; @@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_ xattr_value_len, calc.digest); if (rc) break; - rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL;
