On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 10:36 PM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote: > On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 1:00 PM, One Thousand Gnomes > <gno...@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> wrote: >> On Tue, 8 Mar 2016 13:47:55 -0700 >> Scott Bauer <sba...@eng.utah.edu> wrote: >> >>> This patch adds a sysctl argument to disable SROP protection. >> >> Shouldn't it be a sysctl to enable it irrevocably, otherwise if I have DAC >> capability I can turn off SROP and attack something to get to higher >> capability levels ? >> >> (The way almost all distros are set up its kind of academic but for a >> properly secured system it might matter). > > Perhaps use proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin instead to tie changes > strictly to CAP_SYS_ADMIN?
I don't see why this needs to be irrevocable. If you have CAP_SYS_ADMIN or write access to /proc or whatever, you can do much worse things than turning off a user-level mitigation. For example, you can ptrace things. Also, you're already root, so what's the point? --Andy
