09.05.2016 04:32, Andy Lutomirski пишет:
On May 7, 2016 7:38 AM, "Stas Sergeev" <s...@list.ru> wrote:
03.05.2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski пишет:

If a signal stack is set up with SS_AUTODISARM, then the kernel
inherently avoids incorrectly resetting the signal stack if signals
recurse: the signal stack will be reset on the first signal
delivery.  This means that we don't need check the stack pointer
when delivering signals if SS_AUTODISARM is set.

This will make segmented x86 programs more robust: currently there's
a hole that could be triggered if ESP/RSP appears to point to the
signal stack but actually doesn't due to a nonzero SS base.

Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <s...@list.ru>
Cc: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyp...@cyphar.com>
Cc: Amanieu d'Antras <aman...@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarca...@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <a...@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <l...@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brge...@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlas...@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebied...@xmission.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweis...@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.g...@gmx.de>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.l...@hp.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <j...@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebni...@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <o...@redhat.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <pal...@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmo...@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xe...@parallels.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <pet...@infradead.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <rich...@nod.at>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.le...@oracle.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shua...@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <t...@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavy...@parallels.com>
Cc: linux-...@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
---
   include/linux/sched.h | 12 ++++++++++++
   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 2950c5cd3005..8f03a93348b9 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -2576,6 +2576,18 @@ static inline int kill_cad_pid(int sig, int priv)
    */
   static inline int on_sig_stack(unsigned long sp)
   {
+       /*
+        * If the signal stack is AUTODISARM then, by construction, we
+        * can't be on the signal stack unless user code deliberately set
+        * SS_AUTODISARM when we were already on the it.
"on the it" -> "on it".

Anyway, I am a bit puzzled with this patch.
You say "unless user code deliberately set

SS_AUTODISARM when we were already on the it"
so what happens in case it actually does?

Stack corruption.  Don't do that.
Only after your change, I have to admit. :)

Without your patch: if user sets up the same sas - no stack switch.
if user sets up different sas - stack switch on nested signal.

With your patch: stack switch in any case, so if user
set up same sas - stack corruption by nested signal.

Or am I missing the intention?
The intention is to make everything completely explicit.  With
SS_AUTODISARM, the kernel knows directly whether you're on the signal
stack, and there should be no need to look at sp.  If you set
SS_AUTODISARM and get a signal, the signal stack gets disarmed.  If
you take a nested signal, it's delivered normally.  When you return
all the way out, the signal stack is re-armed.

For DOSEMU, this means that no 16-bit register state can possibly
cause a signal to be delivered wrong, because the register state when
a signal is raised won't affect delivery, which seems like a good
thing to me.
Yes, but doesn't affect dosemu1 which doesn't use SS_AUTODISARM.
So IMHO the SS check should still be added, even if not for dosemu2.

If this behavior would be problematic for you, can you explain why?
Only theoretically: if someone sets SS_AUTODISARM inside a
sighandler. Since this doesn't give EPERM, I wouldn't deliberately
make it a broken scenario (esp if it wasn't before the particular change).
Ideally it would give EPERM, but we can't, so doesn't matter much.
I just wanted to warn about the possible regression.

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