On Tue, 2016-08-16 at 17:20 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > The kernel checks for cases of data structure corruption under some > CONFIGs (e.g. CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST). When corruption is detected, some > systems may want to BUG() immediately instead of letting the system run > with known corruption. Usually these kinds of manipulation primitives can > be used by security flaws to gain arbitrary memory write control. This > provides a new config CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION and a corresponding > macro CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for handling these situations. Notably, even > if not BUGing, the kernel should not continue processing the corrupted > structure. [] > diff --git a/include/linux/bug.h b/include/linux/bug.h [] > @@ -118,4 +118,21 @@ static inline enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned > long bug_addr, > } > > #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */ > + > +/* > + * Since detected data corruption should stop operation on the affected > + * structures, this returns false if the corruption condition is found. > + */ > +#define CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(condition, format...) \
My preference would be to use (condition, fmt, ...) > + do { \ > + if (unlikely(condition)) { \ > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION)) { \ > + printk(KERN_ERR format); \ and pr_err(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); so that any use would also get any local pr_fmt applied as well. > + BUG(); \ > + } else \ > + WARN(1, format); \ > + return false; \ > + } \ > + } while (0) > + > #endif /* _LINUX_BUG_H */