4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

commit 3b8767a8f00cc6538ba6b1cf0f88502e2fd2eb90 upstream.

It should check access_ok().  Otherwise a bunch of places turn into
trivially exploitable rootholes.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>

 arch/frv/include/asm/uaccess.h |   12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/frv/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/frv/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -263,19 +263,25 @@ do {                                                      
 extern long __memset_user(void *dst, unsigned long count);
 extern long __memcpy_user(void *dst, const void *src, unsigned long count);
-#define clear_user(dst,count)                  __memset_user(____force(dst), 
+#define __clear_user(dst,count)                        
__memset_user(____force(dst), (count))
 #define __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, from, n) __memcpy_user((to), 
____force(from), (n))
 #define __copy_to_user_inatomic(to, from, n)   __memcpy_user(____force(to), 
(from), (n))
-#define clear_user(dst,count)                  (memset(____force(dst), 0, 
(count)), 0)
+#define __clear_user(dst,count)                        (memset(____force(dst), 
0, (count)), 0)
 #define __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, from, n) (memcpy((to), ____force(from), 
(n)), 0)
 #define __copy_to_user_inatomic(to, from, n)   (memcpy(____force(to), (from), 
(n)), 0)
-#define __clear_user clear_user
+static inline unsigned long __must_check
+clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
+       if (likely(__access_ok(to, n)))
+               n = __clear_user(to, n);
+       return n;
 static inline unsigned long __must_check
 __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)

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