4.7-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
commit 3b8767a8f00cc6538ba6b1cf0f88502e2fd2eb90 upstream.
It should check access_ok(). Otherwise a bunch of places turn into
trivially exploitable rootholes.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/frv/include/asm/uaccess.h | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/frv/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/frv/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -263,19 +263,25 @@ do {
\
extern long __memset_user(void *dst, unsigned long count);
extern long __memcpy_user(void *dst, const void *src, unsigned long count);
-#define clear_user(dst,count) __memset_user(____force(dst),
(count))
+#define __clear_user(dst,count)
__memset_user(____force(dst), (count))
#define __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, from, n) __memcpy_user((to),
____force(from), (n))
#define __copy_to_user_inatomic(to, from, n) __memcpy_user(____force(to),
(from), (n))
#else
-#define clear_user(dst,count) (memset(____force(dst), 0,
(count)), 0)
+#define __clear_user(dst,count) (memset(____force(dst),
0, (count)), 0)
#define __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, from, n) (memcpy((to), ____force(from),
(n)), 0)
#define __copy_to_user_inatomic(to, from, n) (memcpy(____force(to), (from),
(n)), 0)
#endif
-#define __clear_user clear_user
+static inline unsigned long __must_check
+clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
+{
+ if (likely(__access_ok(to, n)))
+ n = __clear_user(to, n);
+ return n;
+}
static inline unsigned long __must_check
__copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
