4.7-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> commit 1155bafcb79208abc6ae234c6e135ac70607755c upstream. Right now, the kernel address filters in PT are prone to integer overflow that may happen in adding filter's size to its offset to obtain the end of the range. Such an overflow would also throw a #GP in the PT event configuration path. Fix this by explicitly validating the result of this calculation. Reported-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c @@ -1089,8 +1089,13 @@ static int pt_event_addr_filters_validat if (!filter->range || !filter->size) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (!filter->inode && !valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset)) - return -EINVAL; + if (!filter->inode) { + if (!valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset + filter->size)) + return -EINVAL; + } if (++range > pt_cap_get(PT_CAP_num_address_ranges)) return -EOPNOTSUPP;
