On Mon, 03 Oct 2016 11:12:38 +0200
Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> wrote:

> There's a number of 'interesting' problems with FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI, all
> caused by holding hb->lock while doing the rt_mutex_unlock()
> equivalient.
> 
> This patch doesn't attempt to fix any of the actual problems, but
> instead reworks the code to not hold hb->lock across the unlock,
> paving the way to actually fix the problems later.
> 
> The current reason we hold hb->lock over unlock is that it serializes
> against FUTEX_LOCK_PI and avoids new waiters from coming in, this then
> ensures the rt_mutex_next_owner() value is stable and can be written
> into the user-space futex value before doing the unlock. Such that the
> unlock will indeed end up at new_owner.
> 
> This patch recognises that holding rt_mutex::wait_lock results in the
> very same guarantee, no new waiters can come in while we hold that
> lock -- after all, waiters would need this lock to queue themselves.
> 
> It therefore restructures the code to keep rt_mutex::wait_lock held.
> 
> This (of course) is not entirely straight forward either, see the
> comment in rt_mutex_slowunlock(), doing the unlock itself might drop
> wait_lock, letting new waiters in. To cure this
> rt_mutex_futex_unlock() becomes a variant of rt_mutex_slowunlock()
> that return -EAGAIN instead. This ensures the FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI code
> aborts and restarts the entire operation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
> ---
>  kernel/futex.c                  |   63 +++++++++++++++++--------------
>  kernel/locking/rtmutex.c        |   81 
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h |    4 -
>  3 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
> 
> --- a/kernel/futex.c
> +++ b/kernel/futex.c
> @@ -1294,24 +1294,21 @@ static void mark_wake_futex(struct wake_
>  static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_q 
> *top_waiter,
>                        struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
>  {
> -     struct task_struct *new_owner;
>       struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = top_waiter->pi_state;
>       u32 uninitialized_var(curval), newval;
> +     struct task_struct *new_owner;
>       WAKE_Q(wake_q);
> -     bool deboost;
>       int ret = 0;
>  
> -     if (!pi_state)
> -             return -EINVAL;
> +     raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
>  
> +     WARN_ON_ONCE(!atomic_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount));

Don't we have a rule where WARN_ON() and BUG_ON() should never have
"side effects"? That is, they should only check values, but their
contents should not update values.

hence have:

        ret = atomic_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount);
        WARN_ON_ONCE(!ret);

>       /*
> -      * If current does not own the pi_state then the futex is
> -      * inconsistent and user space fiddled with the futex value.
> +      * Now that we hold wait_lock, no new waiters can happen on the
> +      * rt_mutex and new owner is stable. Drop hb->lock.
>        */
> -     if (pi_state->owner != current)
> -             return -EINVAL;
> +     spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
>  

Also, as Sebastian has said before, I believe this breaks rt's migrate
disable code. As migrate disable and migrate_enable are a nop if
preemption is disabled, thus if you hold a raw_spin_lock across a
spin_unlock() when the migrate enable will be a nop, and the
migrate_disable() will never stop.

-- Steve

> -     raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
>       new_owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
>  
>       /*

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