3.16.39-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> commit b8612e517c3c9809e1200b72c474dbfd969e5a83 upstream. Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it was built for, not anything else. If a module signing key is used for multiple ABI-incompatible kernels, the modules need to include enough version information to distinguish them. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]> --- Documentation/module-signing.txt | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/Documentation/module-signing.txt +++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt @@ -239,3 +239,9 @@ Since the private key is used to sign mo the private key to sign modules and compromise the operating system. The private key must be either destroyed or moved to a secure location and not kept in the root node of the kernel source tree. + +If you use the same private key to sign modules for multiple kernel +configurations, you must ensure that the module version information is +sufficient to prevent loading a module into a different kernel. Either +set CONFIG_MODVERSIONS=y or ensure that each configuration has a different +kernel release string by changing EXTRAVERSION or CONFIG_LOCALVERSION.
