As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
the cgroup debug entries.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
---
 kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
index 53bbca7c4859..b794bcadefa4 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, 
void *v)
                struct task_struct *task;
                int count = 0;
 
-               seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset);
+               seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset);
 
                list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) {
                        if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS)
-- 
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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