On 03/01/2017 09:30 AM, Gilad Ben-Yossef wrote: > On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 11:05 PM, Milan Broz <gmazyl...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> On 02/22/2017 07:12 AM, Binoy Jayan wrote: >>> >>> I was wondering if this is near to be ready for submission (apart from >>> the testmgr.c >>> changes) or I need to make some changes to make it similar to the IPSec >>> offload? >> >> I just tried this and except it registers the IV for every new device again, >> it works... >> (After a while you have many duplicate entries in /proc/crypto.) >> >> But I would like to see some summary why such a big patch is needed in the >> first place. >> (During an internal discussions seems that people are already lost in mails >> and >> patches here, so Ondra promised me to send some summary mail soon here.) >> >> IIRC the first initial problem was dmcrypt performance on some embedded >> crypto processors that are not able to cope with small crypto requests >> effectively. >> >> >> Do you have some real performance numbers that proves that such a patch is >> adequate? >> >> I would really like to see the performance issue fixed but I am really not >> sure >> this approach works for everyone. It would be better to avoid repeating this >> exercise later. >> IIRC Ondra's "bulk" mode, despite rejected, shows that there is a potential >> to speedup things even for crypt drivers that do not support own IV >> generators. >> > > AFAIK the problem that we are trying to solve is that if the IV is > generated outside the crypto API > domain than you are forced to have an invocation of the crypto API per > each block because you > need to provide the IV for each block. > > By putting the IV generation responsibility in the Crypto API we open > the way to do a single invocation > of the crypto API for a whole sequence of blocks.
Sure, but this is theory. Does it really work on some hw already? Do you have performance measurements or comparison? > For software implementation of XTS this doesn't matter much - but for > hardware based XTS providers It is not only embedded crypto, we have some more reports in the past that 512B sectors are not ideal even for other systems. (IIRC it was also with AES-NI that represents really big group of users). > This lead some vendors to ship hacked up versions of dm-crypt to match > the specific crypto hardware > they were using, or so I've heard at least - didn't see the code myself. I saw few version of that. There was a very hacky way to provide request-based dmcrypt (see old "Introduce the request handling for dm-crypt" thread on dm-devel). This is not the acceptable way but definitely it points to the same problem. > I believe Binoy is trying to address this in a generic upstream worthy > way instead. IIRC the problem is performance, if we can solve it by some generic way, good, but for now it seems to be a big change and just hope it helps later... > Anyway, you are only supposed to see s difference when using a > hardware based XTS provider algo > that supports IV generation. > >> I like the patch is now contained inside dmcrypt, but it still exposes IVs >> that >> are designed just for old, insecure, compatibility-only containers. >> >> I really do not think every compatible crap must be accessible through >> crypto API. >> (I wrote the dmcrypt lrw and tcw compatibility IVs and I would never do that >> this way >> if I know it is accessible outside of dmcrypt internals...) >> Even the ESSIV is something that was born to fix predictive IVs (CBC >> watermarking >> attacks) for disk encryption only, no reason to expose it outside of disk >> encryption. >> > > The point is that you have more than one implementation of these > "compatible crap" - the > software implementation that you wrote and potentially multiple > hardware implementations > and putting this in the crypto API domain is the way to abstract this > so you use the one > that works best of your platform. For XTS you need just simple linear IV. No problem with that, implementation in crypto API and hw is trivial. But for compatible IV (that provides compatibility with loopAES and very old TrueCrypt), these should be never ever implemented again anywhere. Specifically "tcw" is broken, insecure and provided here just to help people to migrate from old Truecrypt containers. Even Truecrypt followers removed it from the codebase. (It is basically combination of IV and slight modification of CBC mode. All recent version switched to XTS and plain IV.) So building abstraction over something known to be broken and that is now intentionally isolated inside dmcrypt is, in my opinion, really not a good idea. But please do get me wrong, I do not want to block any improvement. But it seems to me that this thread focused on creating nice crypto API interface for FDE IVs instead of demonstration that the proposed solution really solves the performance issue. And not only for your hw driver, maybe other systems could benefit from the better processing of small requests as well. Milan
