Hi Andrew, [Yes, top posting :-)]
With the merge window approaching, just a reminder that this conflict still exists. On Thu, 8 Jun 2017 16:28:12 +1000 Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]> wrote: > > Today's linux-next merge of the akpm-current tree got a conflict in: > > include/linux/random.h > > between commit: > > 60473a13020f ("random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait > family") > > from the random tree and commit: > > d7802aa82f66 ("random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function") > > from the akpm-current tree. > > I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This > is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial > conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree > is submitted for merging. You may also want to consider cooperating > with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly > complex conflicts. > > -- > Cheers, > Stephen Rothwell > > diff --cc include/linux/random.h > index 4aecc339558d,1fa0dc880bd7..000000000000 > --- a/include/linux/random.h > +++ b/include/linux/random.h > @@@ -58,31 -57,27 +58,52 @@@ static inline unsigned long get_random_ > #endif > } > > +/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, > nbytes). > + * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */ > +static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes) > +{ > + int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); > + if (unlikely(ret)) > + return ret; > + get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); > + return 0; > +} > + > +#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \ > + static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \ > + int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \ > + if (unlikely(ret)) \ > + return ret; \ > + *out = get_random_ ## var(); \ > + return 0; \ > + } > +declare_get_random_var_wait(u32) > +declare_get_random_var_wait(u64) > +declare_get_random_var_wait(int) > +declare_get_random_var_wait(long) > +#undef declare_get_random_var > + > + /* > + * On 64-bit architectures, protect against non-terminated C string > overflows > + * by zeroing out the first byte of the canary; this leaves 56 bits of > entropy. > + */ > + #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT > + # ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN > + # define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffffffff00UL > + # else /* big endian, 64 bits: */ > + # define CANARY_MASK 0x00ffffffffffffffUL > + # endif > + #else /* 32 bits: */ > + # define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffUL > + #endif > + > + static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void) > + { > + unsigned long val = get_random_long(); > + > + return val & CANARY_MASK; > + } > + > unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range); > > u32 prandom_u32(void); -- Cheers, Stephen Rothwell
