On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 10:49 PM, Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 10:39 PM, Linus Torvalds
>> And I think the credentials switch (which is the point of no return
>> anyway) happens before we start mmap'ing the executable etc. We used
>> to have some odd code there and do it in the completely wrong order
>> (checking that the binary was executable for the *old* user, which
>> makes no sense, iirc)
>
> Yeah, it all happens in setup_new_exec(). The first thing is layout
> selection, then switching credentials. It could be made to take a hint
> from GNU_STACK (which was parsed before setup_new_exec() is called),
> check security_bprm_secureexec() and then make the rlimit changes, all
> before the layout selection.
At Andy's suggestion I'm using security_bprm_secureexec() to test for
setuid-ness. However, this seems to expect the credentials to have
already been installed. And yet ... the following patch still works
correctly when I call it "early". I'm going to look again in the
morning.
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index b60804216b59..a4d2433a44ec 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1334,9 +1334,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump);
void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
+ /* This is the point of no return */
+
+ /*
+ * If this is a setuid execution, reset the stack limit to
+ * a sane default to avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits.
+ */
+ if (security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)) {
+ struct rlimit default_stack = { _STK_LIM, RLIM_INFINITY };
+
+ current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK] = default_stack;
+ }
+
arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
- /* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
