4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Mateusz Jurczyk <[email protected]> commit f55ce7b024090a51382ccab2730b96e2f7b4e9cf upstream. Verify that the length of the socket buffer is sufficient to cover the nlmsghdr structure before accessing the nlh->nlmsg_len field for further input sanitization. If the client only supplies 1-3 bytes of data in sk_buff, then nlh->nlmsg_len remains partially uninitialized and contains leftover memory from the corresponding kernel allocation. Operating on such data may result in indeterminate evaluation of the nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN expression. The bug was discovered by a runtime instrumentation designed to detect use of uninitialized memory in the kernel. The patch prevents this and other similar tools (e.g. KMSAN) from flagging this behavior in the future. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Cc: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c @@ -463,8 +463,7 @@ static void nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch(stru if (msglen > skb->len) msglen = skb->len; - if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || - skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN + sizeof(struct nfgenmsg)) + if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN + sizeof(struct nfgenmsg)) return; err = nla_parse(cda, NFNL_BATCH_MAX, attr, attrlen, nfnl_batch_policy, @@ -491,7 +490,8 @@ static void nfnetlink_rcv(struct sk_buff { struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); - if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || + if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || + nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) return;
